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The Problem of the Terror Non-State
RESCUING INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM ISIS AND
BOKO HARAM
Darin E.W. Johnson†
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-first century conflicts have brought the rise of the
terror non-state—an entity that has disrupted the global
community’s security and its paradigmatic legal frameworks. The
terror non-state is typified by terrorist groups, such as the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram, that have wrested
control of large swaths of territory from sovereign governments,
forming entities that flout the rule of law and subvert the human
rights of those falling under their control.1 These terrorist
organizations, traditionally understood to be non-state actors
under international law, have claimed the authority to govern their
taken territory and in so doing have disrupted traditional
distinctions between states and non-state actors in international
† Assistant Professor, Howard University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School; B.A., Yale College. The author formerly served in the State Department Office of
the Legal Adviser, including positions as an attorney-adviser on United Nations Affairs,
and as the legal adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. He also served as Chief of Staff
in the Office of Middle East Transitions at the Department of State and helped to
coordinate U.S. assistance and related policy toward Arab Spring countries, including
Syria. The author would like to thank his research assistant, Vanessa Stephens, for her
assistance with the research and development of this article. The author would like to
thank the Howard University School of Law for a summer research grant which
contributed to the completion of this article. The author would also like to thank the
participants in the John Mercer Langston writing workshop for their helpful feedback
and comments on this article. Finally, the author would like to thank the editors of the
Brooklyn Law Review for their helpful comments throughout the editorial process.
1 For a discussion of ISIS human rights abuses, see generally U.S. Dep’t of State,
Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Iraq 2017 Human Rights Report (2017) [hereinafter
Iraq Human Rights Report], https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277487.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LK57-AB3V]; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab.,
Syria 2017 Human Rights Report (2017) [hereinafter Syria Human Rights Report],
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277509.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR24WZXW]. For discussion of Boko Haram human rights abuses, see generally U.S.
Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Nigeria 2017 Human Rights Report
(2017) [hereinafter Nigeria Human Rights Report], https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/277277.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGC7-9QBA] [hereinafter collectively referred
to as “2017 State Department Human Rights Reports for Nigeria, Iraq and Syria”].
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law. Unlike other combatants in domestic civil conflicts, terror nonstates have not sought legitimacy in the eyes of the global
community. Instead they have flouted the international
community by engaging in global and regional terror attacks,
which has necessitated an international response.2
While the international community has achieved some
military success in retaking territory from groups such as ISIS, the
legal challenges presented by terror non-states remain,
threatening to confound the international community’s response
well into the future.3 Terror non-states, such as ISIS and Boko
Haram, will continue to rise in weak states and threaten the global
community. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the challenges
that terror non-states present to international legal frameworks—
from the protection of human rights to the legality of military
response—is crucial for the formulation of legitimate responses.
Legal scholarship has not fully examined how terror non-states
have disrupted the traditional dichotomy between states and nonstate actors under international law. This article addresses that
gap by using the cases of ISIS and Boko Haram to define the
characteristics of a terror non-state and to discuss the ways in
which terror non-states have challenged international law while
engaging in widespread terror against local populations and the
global community. The article frames its recommendations for the
treatment of terror non-states under international law from a
perspective that prioritizes the liberation and protection of
vulnerable populations. From this perspective, the article
recommends that the United Nations Security Council pass a
resolution that mandates that terror non-states comply with
international human rights obligations in the territories that they
2 See Tim Lister, et al., ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have
Killed 2,043, CNN (Feb. 12, 2018, 11:24 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/
mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html [https://perma.cc/3AVS-ZPWS]; Mark
Wilson, Nigeria’s Boko Haram Attacks in Numbers As Lethal As Ever, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42735414 [https://perma.cc/6REY-2SUL].
3 By late 2017, the international bombing campaign led by the United States
aided Iraqi and Syrian forces in retaking ISIS’ strongholds in Mosul, Iraq and in Raqqa,
Syria. See Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, Raqqa, ISIS ‘Capital,’ Is Captured, U.S.-Backed
Forces Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/
middleeast/isis-syria-raqqa.html [https://perma.cc/K8Y3-YR3T]; J. Weston Phippen, Iraqi
Forces Take Mosul, ATLANTIC (July 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/
2017/07/iraqi-forces-take-mosul/533055/ [https://perma.cc/5ZMZ-FAZ4]. By early 2018,
ISIS’ territory was limited to its final stronghold in Hajin, Syria. See Rukmini Callimachi,
Fight to Retake Last ISIS Territory Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/middleeast/isis-syria.html [https://perma.cc/
CV4F-TPQH]. In March 2019, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces announced that
they had driven ISIS out of its last stronghold in Syria. Bethan McKernan, ISIS Defeated,
US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces Announce, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2019, 3:28 AM EDT).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/isis-defeated-us-backed-syrian-democraticforces-announce [https://perma.cc/8K7U-ZWNY].
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control. The article also determines that terror non-states’
destructive foreign attacks subject them to responsive foreign
military intervention. The article further concludes that terror
non-states’ oppression of vulnerable populations eliminates any
claim that they are entitled to immunity from domestic law during
armed conflict. Finally, the article recommends that the United
Nations establish an international tribunal for war crimes and
human rights violations committed by ISIS, that Boko Haram
leaders be referred to the International Criminal Court, and that
the international community enhance its cooperation and support
for the domestic prosecution of ISIS and Boko Haram.
This article proceeds in the following parts. Part I
explains the critical lens through which this paper assesses
terror non-states’ impact on international law, which draws
from Third World Approaches to International Law and the
universal goals of international human rights law. Part II
defines the characteristics of the terror non-state, distinguishes
them from traditional non-state actors involved in civil conflicts,
and explains how those distinctions present unique challenges
for international legal frameworks. Part III discusses how ISIS
and Boko Haram established terror non-states that severely
abrogated the human rights of their victims under international
law. Part IV discusses challenges that terror non-states present
to the authorized use of force through foreign military
intervention. Part V discusses the international humanitarian
law framework that should apply to the conduct of hostilities
with terror non-states. Part VI discusses the mechanisms of
accountability available for ISIS and Boko Haram. Part VII
offers a comprehensive summation of the recommended
approaches to respond to ISIS, Boko Haram, and other terror
non-states under international law and concludes.
I.

A LIBERATION AND PROTECTION APPROACH FOR
RESPONDING TO ISIS AND BOKO HARAM UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

This article assesses the impact that terror non-states
have on the implementation of international law and recommends
responses that reflect a liberation and protection approach. This
article originates the concept of a liberation and protection
approach that provides legal scholars and practitioners with a
framework for assessing responses to terror non-states under
international law. A liberation and protection approach places the
liberation and protection of those most vulnerable to oppression
and harm by terror non-states—the individuals subject to their
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territorial control—at the forefront of its analysis. Their
liberation and protection are the primary concerns of this paper.
A liberation and protection approach finds common cause with
the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
project, though it is not constrained by it. A liberation and
protection approach also accords with the goals of the modern
international human rights law movement, which seeks to protect
the human rights of vulnerable populations.
TWAIL scholars and advocates posit that international
law, as advanced by Western States, has created winners and
losers among states.4 For example, Western European colonial
powers created international rules of law that legalized the taking
of territory and land from indigenous peoples.5 TWAIL scholars
argue that this is an example of the way in which international
law has been used as a tool of subordination by powerful states.6
TWAIL scholars articulate the ways in which this subordination
continues in the modern international legal system by privileging
certain powerful states, such as the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council who hold veto power in that
body, above Third World or developing states that hold no such
power.7 TWAIL scholars make similar observations about the
influence of powerful states in international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund, and within international organizations, such as the World
Trade Organization, suggesting that these states are able to
advance lending criteria and trade policies in the institutions that
preference the Global North against the Global South.8
My liberation and protection approach is distinct from
TWAIL, in that it offers critiques of the international legal
system that fall against the strong (dominating) states and weak
(subordinated) states alike, in the interest of protecting the most
vulnerable. Unlike TWAIL, this article is not primarily
concerned with the power that dominant and subordinate states
hold in regard to one another within the international legal
system. Rather, it is focused primarily on the liberation and
protection of vulnerable populations impacted by terror nonstates. My liberation and protection lens requires assessment of
the ways in which strong states assert their power against weak
4 See generally Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in
International Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353 (1998).
5 See Robert J. Miller, The International Law of Colonialism: A Comparative
Analysis, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 847, 851–55 (2011).
6 See Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31, 31 (2000).
7 Id. at 34.
8 Id. at 35.
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states and harm vulnerable populations, just as it advocates
empowering institutions such as the International Criminal
Court over the objection of Third World regimes who believe the
court unfairly impinges upon their sovereignty in a way that it
does not impinge upon powerful states.
Additionally, my liberation and protection approach is
concerned with the liberation of vulnerable populations from
oppressive terror non-states and oppressive sovereign regimes
alike. My approach is aligned with the aspiration of the modern
international human rights movement to free individuals from
abuse and oppression globally. As a body of law, international
human rights law progressively develops through treaty and
corollary state practice those fundamental rights that state
sovereigns owe to their citizens. International human rights law
advocates have created a legal system that legally binds states,
through their ratification of treaties, to ensure human rights are
enforced domestically. International human rights law, by design,
seeks to obligate states not to oppress their citizens and to protect
their citizens from oppression by others. A liberation and
protection approach advances the universal protection goals of
international human rights law.
II.

DISTINGUISHING TERROR NON-STATES FROM OTHER
VIOLENT OPPOSITION GROUPS

Terror non-states are the most recent iteration of a
phenomenon that has presented a long-standing challenge to the
international legal system—how to legally situate and respond to
entities that have taken power and territory by force, within an
international legal system that is deferential to territorial control
but in principle permits only peaceful transfers of territory.9 The
terror non-state is similar yet distinct from prior non-state
entities that have sought to take territory by force, including anticolonial liberation movements in Africa; anti-government
revolutionary groups in the Americas and Asia; political parties
associated with armed groups engaged in terror in the Middle
East; and regional governments that have sought independence
in Europe, including through domestic terror.10 In addition to
9 The U.N. General Assembly declared that under the United Nations Charter,
states may not recognize a “territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.”
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, pmbl. (Oct. 24, 1970).
10 As discussed in this Part, such groups include anti-colonial liberation
movements in Algeria and Mozambique; revolutionary groups such as the FARC in
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seeking territory, these entities have often sought legitimacy and
recognition in the eyes of the global community even as they
waged battle in their home states.11
Terror non-states have not sought legitimacy in the eyes of
the global community but instead, have unleashed a campaign of
terror on those states that protect the global order. Their
indifference to global legitimacy, their terror attacks outside of their
state, and their assertion of power over vulnerable populations that
have not sought their leadership distinguish the modern terror nonstate from other violent opposition groups. In order to understand
the unique characteristics of the modern terror non-state, it is useful
to assess the characteristics of other violent opposition groups, which
I divide into four categories: (1) anticolonial liberation movements;
(2) revolutionary guerrilla groups; (3) political parties associated
with terror; and (4) violent secessionist groups.12
A.

Anti-Colonial Liberation Movements

A number of the mid-twentieth century transitions from
colonialism to independence in Africa involved the use of force
against colonizing powers by national liberation movements.
Although denounced by colonial powers as terrorists, liberation
movements in countries, such as Algeria and Mozambique, sought
legitimacy in the eyes of the global community through recognition
by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the United
Nations General Assembly as the legitimate representatives of the

Colombia and Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; Hamas in the Palestinian Territories; and
Basque separatists in Northern Spain. See infra notes 13–25.
11 Anti-colonial movements sought recognition as successor governments;
revolutionary groups sought control of the government; Hamas sought recognition as a
governing political party; and Basque separatists sought recognition of their territory as a
sovereign entity. See e.g., Frode Løvlie, Explaining Hamas’s Changing Electoral Strategy,
1996–2006, 48 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 570, 571 (2013) (explaining how Hamas sought
recognition as a governing political party); Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the
Recognition of States and Governments, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 554 n.32 (1999)
(describing how Basque separatists sought recognition of their territory as a sovereign entity).
12 Although I have characterized violent opposition groups as comprising four
distinct categories, I acknowledge that there is some fluidity and overlap among these
groups. For example, many colonial liberation movements have later become political
parties after they have removed colonial ruling regimes, or the successors of colonial
ruling regimes. See, e.g., Marina Ottaway, Liberation Movements and Transition to
Democracy; The Case of the A.N.C., 29 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 61, 63 (1991) (discussing
transition of the African National Congress from liberation movement to political party).
These groups, however, generally renounce violence when they transition into the political
arena. See VERONIQUE DUDOUET, FROM WAR TO POLITICS: RESISTANCE/LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS IN TRANSITION 38–43 (Berghof Res. Ctr. for Constructive Conflict Mgmt., Rep.
No. 17, 2009) https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/
Papers/Reports/br17e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSZ8-EC2T].
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people.13 Because they were seen as the future governing powers in
their countries, the General Assembly granted liberation
movements recognized by the OAU, participation rights as
observers in United Nations bodies, specialized agencies, and at
international conferences for the negotiation of treaties.14 National
liberation movements also achieved special status under an
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which provided
them with certain immunities and protections in their conduct of
hostilities—rights previously possessed only by states.15
B.

Revolutionary Guerilla Groups

Like liberation movements, revolutionary groups from
South America to South Asia have engaged in guerrilla warfare
with their national governments. Rather than expelling
previously departed colonial powers, these revolutionary groups
have been motivated by a wide range of grievances against their
national governments, including differing political and economic
ideologies.16 In their campaign to take power, some of these
groups have taken territory and became engaged in sustained
guerilla conflict with their states. Two such groups—the
Revolutionary Armed Forced of Columbia (FARC) and the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka—engaged in decades-long conflicts with their
states, including various forms of domestic terror that resulted in
tens of thousands of deaths.17 They differ from terror non-states
13 One of the purposes and objectives of the Organization for African Unity’s
Charter was to “eradicate of all forms of colonialism from Africa.” Org. of African Unity
[OAU] Charter art. 2, ¶ 1(d); see also P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity
and Its Role in Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical
Evaluation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 537, 542–45 (1999) (“The purposes and objectives
of the OAU, as enumerated in Article II, are: . . . to eradicate all forms of colonialism
from Africa.”). The Organization for African Unity’s recognition of liberation movements
as the legitimate representatives of the people, including those in Namibia, Angola, Cape
Verde, Guinea, and Mozambique, were subsequently endorsed by the UN General
Assembly by resolution. See Konstantinos Mastorodimos, National Liberation
Movements: Still a Valid Concept (with Special Reference to International Humanitarian
Law)?, 17 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 78–81 (2015).
14 G.A. Res. 3280 (XXIX), ¶¶ 5–6 (Dec. 10, 1974).
15 See discussion infra Part VII; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 1, ¶ 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Mastorodimos,
supra note 13, at 88–102.
16 For example, the Colombian civil war between the FARC and the Colombian
government began as a clash between the Liberal and Conservative parties. See Lily
Rothman, What to Know About the Origins of the FARC, TIME (Sept. 26, 2016),
http://time.com/4507568/colombia-farc-history/ [https://perma.cc/QW8F-9PUL].
17 See Nick Miroff, The Staggering Toll of Colombia’s War with FARC Rebels,
Explained in Numbers, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/the-staggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with-farc-rebels-explainedin-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/YQZ6-7WXZ]. The Tamil Tigers sought independent areas in
Sri Lanka for the minority ethnic Tamil community. See Preeti Bhattacharji,
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because their campaigns of terror have been primarily limited to
their domestic opponents.
C.

Political Parties Associated with Terror

Groups like Hamas could be considered precursors to terror
non-states, in that they have sought results through campaigns of
terror, yet they have also become political parties that have taken
on governance responsibilities. Like terror non-states, Hamas
controls territory in the Gaza Strip; however, unlike a terror nonstate, Hamas holds territory in part due to a domestically
legitimate process—the 2007 Palestinian parliamentary
elections—which resulted in Hamas’ electoral victory.18 Since that
time, Hamas has intermittently clashed and reconciled with
Palestine’s other governing party, Fatah, over control of the Gaza
Strip in the Palestinian Territories.19 Like terror non-states that
attack countries outside their territory, Hamas has been involved
with external terror attacks against Israel.20
D.

Violent Secessionist Groups

Finally, secessionist groups all over the world have
advocated for territorial independence, sometimes resorting to
violent campaigns against their sovereign governments. The
Spanish government has faced a violent secessionist movement
from Basque separatists in northern Spain; the United Kingdom
faced a violent secessionist movement in Northern Ireland for
decades, and Russia continues to face attacks from violent
Chechen separatists.21 Many separatist groups advocate for

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 20, 2009),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/liberation-tigers-tamil-eelam-aka-tamil-tigers-srilanka-separatists [https://perma.cc/S9BX-NJJ7].
18 See Zena Tahhan, Hamas and Fattah: How Are the Two Groups Different,
AL JAZEERA (Oct. 12, 2017). https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/hamasfatah-goal-approaches-171012064342008.html [https://perma.cc/D34M-RAR].
19 See Zack Beauchamp, Everything You Need to Know About Israel-Palestine,
VOX (May 14, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/hamas
[https://perma.cc/HD9E-R94D].
20 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT: SUICIDE BOMBING
ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI CITIZENS 66 (2002), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/ISRAELPA1002.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ5F-HSKU].
21 See TERESA WHITFIELD, THE BASQUE CONFLICT AND ETA: THE DIFFICULTIES
OF AN ENDING 2–8 (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Rep. 384, 2015), https://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/SR384-The-Basque-Conflict-and-ETA-The-Difficulties-of-An-Ending.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KG3M-B4EC]; KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21333,
NORTHERN IRELAND: CURRENT ISSUES AND ONGOING CHALLENGES IN THE PEACE PROCESS
1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21333.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3F8-7X64]; Elisabeth
Smick, The Chechen Separatist Movement, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 18, 2006),
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greater autonomy or independence from their national
governments, but violent secessionist groups are distinguished by
their terror campaigns. For example, in December 2007, Basque
secessionists bombed the Madrid airport, killing two more
civilians in its over forty year terror campaign against the
Spanish national government that has resulted in more than 800
deaths;22 the Irish Republican Army engaged in a decades-long
bombing campaign throughout England;23 and Chechen
separatists staged numerous attacks, including the Beslan school
attack in 2004 that resulted in 331 hostage deaths, the majority
of whom were children.24 Violent separatist groups share a
capacity for widespread violent terror attacks, however their
attacks are typically directed inward at national governments
and domestic civilians. Unlike terror non-states, they do not
generally control territory by armed force, though affiliated
political parties may exercise some degree of regional control by
virtue of arrangements with the national government.25 Full
territorial control and governance are aspirational. As discussed
below, terror non-states already control territory and assert their
authority to govern citizens subject to their control.
E.

Terror Non-State

The second decade of the twenty-first century has seen the
rise of terrorist organizations that have successfully taken control
of large swaths of territory in the Middle East and Africa. While
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda aspired to form a caliphate,26
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chechen-separatist-movement [https://perma.cc/S9PGBYCJ].
22 John Ward Anderson, Spain’s Peace Process in Tatters After Basque Separatist
Bombing, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/02/17/AR2007021701327.html [https://perma.cc/4UMY-UQVW].
23 See Josh Lowe, London Isn’t Burning: How Britain’s History with the IRA Made
it Resilient in the Face of Attack, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/
london-attack-ira-terror-threat-severe-bomb-terrorism-573629 [https://perma.cc/68JQANWN]; see also ARCHICK, supra note 21, at 1.
24 Peter Finn, Blast Kills Leader of Separatists in Chechnya, WASH. POST (July
11, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR200607
1000307.html [https://perma.cc/BM9J-GDN2].
25 For example, Sinn Fein, an Irish political party associated with the Irish
Republican Army, an armed group that engaged in a thirty-year guerilla campaign for
Northern Ireland’s independence from the United Kingdom, was one of the signatories of
the Good Friday Peace Accord which ended the civil conflict—and granted Sinn Fein
political status in the U.K. Parliament. Joe Tambini, What Is Sinn Fein? What Does Sinn
Fein Mean and What Is the Good Friday Agreement?, EXPRESS (June 26, 2017),
https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/817923/sinn-fein-meaning-good-friday-agreement-dupgerry-adams-ira-links-history [https://perma.cc/B5UM-8GYT]; Good Friday Agreement, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement [https://perma.cc/PMQ2-BW3S].
26 “Al Qaeda in theory supports a caliphate, but . . . envisioned this as a longterm goal. . . . Al Qaeda has never shown much interest in taking or holding territory in
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ISIS succeeded in actualizing that shared goal by taking physical
territory from the governments of Syria and Iraq,27 just as Boko
Haram took physical territory from the government of Nigeria.28
ISIS and Boko Haram straddle two different categories under
international law, as they possess characteristics of both non-state
actors and states. Like most terrorist groups or organizations, they
can easily be categorized as non-state actors under international
law, as they are organizations, not states.29 Unlike many terror
groups, however, ISIS and Boko Haram have taken territory and
sought to govern those falling under their control. Nonetheless,
they have failed to meet the traditional definition of statehood as
defined in the Montevideo Convention, one of the only treaties to
specifically define the characteristics of a state.30 Although the
Montevideo Convention was drafted, signed, and ratified only by
Western Hemisphere states in the Organization of American
States, it is frequently cited by international scholars as indicative
of the criteria for statehood, namely, possessing: (1) defined
territory, (2) a permanent population, (3) government, and (4) the
capacity to enter into diplomatic relations.31 ISIS and Boko Haram
order to set up an Islamic state and govern, despite the fact that doing so is one of its stated
goals; on the contrary, the only reason it has ever shown interest in territory is as a safe
haven and as a place to set up training camps.” Daniel L. Byman & Jennifer R. Williams,
ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War, BROOKINGS CTR. FOR MIDDLE EAST POL’Y
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civilwar/ [https://perma.cc/L3HA-26LF].
27 “ISIS’s primary strategic target is the consolidation and expansion of the
lands and authority of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other neighboring Muslim
countries. ISIS wants to destroy the colonial borders in the . . . Levant, which were
drawn by the European powers at the end of World War One. In doing so, the group seeks
to replace the ‘apostate’ regimes with an Islamic state, a caliphate.” FAWAZ A. GERGES,
ISIS A HISTORY 7 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2016).
28 “Over several years Boko Haram established significant territory in the
northeast of Nigeria. At its peak in 2014, the group controlled approximately 20,000 square
miles, a territory roughly the size of Belgium, while controlling a population of more than 1.7
million people.” Intel Brief, Boko Haram Evolves But Remains a Substantial Threat in
Nigeria, CIPHER BRIEF (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/bokoharam-evolves-but-remains-a-substantial-threat-in-nigeria [https://perma.cc/9LQJ-MUX6].
29 “Even though the term ‘non-state actor’ can be defined quite simply as any
entity that is not a state, it deserves some explanation. In some contexts, the term is used
to refer to benign civil society groups working for human rights. . . . In other contexts,
however, the term is understood to refer to some very ‘uncivil’ groups determined to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and target them against a civilian population. . . . Depending
on the context, international law provides that states are either obliged to punish non-state
actors or, alternatively, obliged to cooperate with them.” Andrew Clapham, Non-State
Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 531, 531 (Oxford Univ. Press, Moeckli et al.,
eds., 2d ed. 2014).
30 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
31 Id.; see also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention and Its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 414–16 (1998) (noting
that the Montevideo Convention is frequently cited by international law scholars as
reflecting the primary criteria for statehood).
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do not control defined territory because their borders shift with
their success or failure on the battlefield, as does the makeup of
their impermanent forced population.32 While ISIS and Boko
Haram may claim that they are legitimate governments, they do not
have the consent of the governed. Customary international law, as
reflected in the Montevideo Convention, prohibits the use of military
force to acquire territory or to compel the recognition of statehood.33
Despite their failure to establish entities that meet the
legal definition of a state, ISIS and Boko Haram have asserted
their authority by violent force to govern thousands of Syrians,
Iraqis, and Nigerians within the territory that they have taken.34
They have subjected these individuals to brutal and ruthless
treatment and have violated every human right imaginable.35
Further, they have engaged in terror campaigns domestically and
abroad to spread their message of hate, gain allies, and to seek to
intimidate states that have opposed them militarily.36 The violent
taking of territory, the assertion of governance authority over
thousands of forced subjects, the violation of human rights on a
massive scale, and the waging of violent terror campaigns against
internal and external states are attributes of the terror non-state.
These attributes make the terror non-state a challenging entity
to address under international law. The impact that terror nonstates have upon human rights enforcement, authorized military
intervention, the conduct of war, and international criminal
responsibility are explored in the Parts that follow.

See discussion infra Part IV.
Montevideo Convention, supra note 30, at art. 11; see also U.N. Charter art.
2, ¶ 4 (prohibiting the use of force against the territorial integrity of a state). The
International Court of Justice has held that the principles of the U.N. Charter relating
to the threat or use of force are part of customary international law with the character
of jus cogens. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27). Further, the U.N. General
Assembly has declared that “[t]he territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition
by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition
resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal [subsequent to the
UN Charter regime].” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations ¶ 1 (Oct. 24, 1970).
34 See U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to Security Council High-Level Summit
on Foreign Terrorist Fighters (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/
index.asp?nid=8040 [https://perma.cc/G4WH-NVTU] (“Muslim leaders around the world
have said, groups like ISIL—or Da’ish—have nothing to do with Islam, and they certainly
do not represent a state. They should more fittingly be called the ‘Un-Islamic Non-State.’”);
see also Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, The End of Law: The ISIL Case Study for a
Comprehensive Theory of Lawlessness, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 355, 379 (2015).
35 See, e.g., 2017 State Department Human Rights Reports for Nigeria, Iraq
and Syria, supra note 1.
36 See, e.g., Lister et al., supra note 2; Wilson, supra note 2.
32

33
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THE SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF TERROR
NON-STATES

Terror non-states do not respect the legal obligations that
sovereign states have undertaken to protect human rights in their
territory, and they are flagrant violators of those same human
rights. This section details the terror non-states that ISIS and Boko
Haram have formed and the massive human rights violations that
they have committed.
A.

ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), owes its existence
to many factors including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and
the subsequent dissolution of the Iraqi army and Baathist
loyalists from the Iraq government.37 Many of the former
Baathists and Sunni members of the Iraqi army and government
became part of the radicalized insurgency against the U.S.
occupation and the subsequent Shia-led elected Iraqi
government.38 These insurgents broke away from Al Qaeda,
continued their insurgency against the Iraqi government, and
exploited a vacuum in control in Syria, due to its post Arab Spring
civil war, to help ISIS form a declared caliphate across Syria and
Iraq.39 In the course of taking territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS
defeated both Iraqi and Syrian forces, drawing from experience
that its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his followers had
gained during years of civil warfare with the Shiite Iraqi
government, resources that ISIS took through the taking of oil
refineries and dams, and through a growing operation of terrorist
financing from bribery, extortion, ransom, and kidnappings.40
ISIS’ takeover of a wide swath of territory in Iraq and
Syria was formally recognized as a threat to the international
community in November 2015, when the United Nations Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 2249 calling upon
member states to “take all necessary measures . . . to eradicate
37 See Johan D. van der Vyver, The ISIS Crisis and the Development of
International Humanitarian Law, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 531, 535 (2016); see also
GERGES, supra note 27, at 154–55; Sourgens, supra note 34, at 376.
38 GERGES, supra note 27, at 154–55.
39 See id. at 170–76.
40 See PATRICK COCKBURN, THE AGE OF JIHAD: ISLAMIC STATE AND THE GREAT
WAR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 333-35, 353 (2016); Ashley Fantz, How ISIS Makes (and Takes)
Money, CNN (Feb. 19, 2015, 10:44 PM ET); https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/world/howisis-makes-money/index.html [https://perma.cc/GBL5-2TVJ]; see also Sourgens, supra note
34, at 376–79; van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 532–33.
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the safe haven they [ISIS] have established over significant parts
of Iraq and Syria.”41 “Terrorist safe havens” are “ungoverned,
under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists
are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit,
train, transit, and operate in relative security because of
inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”42
The designation of the territory taken by ISIS as a terrorist
safe haven reflects the international community’s legitimate
concern that ISIS would use its territory to plan terrorist attacks
not just against the governments of Iraq and Syria, but also against
any state perceived as a threat or challenge to its ideology.43
The term terrorist safe haven does not fully capture the
nature of the stronghold that ISIS built in Iraq and Syria. ISIS
did not simply take control of an ungoverned, sparsely
populated, safe space from which to plan attacks. Instead, it
violently took control of heavily populated areas and major cities
such as Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, and Al Raqqa, the
sixth largest city in Syria, whose sizable populations had been
subject to long-standing, though dysfunctional and corrupt,
institutions of governance under Iraqi and Syrian law.44 ISIS’
motivation was to replace these local systems of governance with
its own laws and institutions, as part of its creation of a
caliphate. In a typical safe haven, a sovereign state provides
tacit or de facto consent to the presence of a terrorist group
which has no desire to govern.45 The term terror non-state more
fully reflects the reality of the stronghold established by ISIS:
where it sought not merely to operate with government sanction,
but instead violently took territory and claimed authority to
govern. ISIS maintained control through a combination of
41 S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 5 (Nov. 20, 2015); see also Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force
Against Non-State Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 23 (2015); van der Vyver,
supra note 37, at 536–37.
42 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent
Extremism, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2015 at 307 (2016), https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/258249.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB3Z-BNAK].
43 Louise Arimatsu & Michael Schmitt, The Legal Basis for War Against ISIS
Remains Contentious, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2014, 4:00 AM EDT), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamic-state
[https://perma.cc/TXF3-7XTS].
44 See GERGES, supra note 27, at 171–75; Rukmini Callimachi, The ISIS Files:
When Terrorists Run City Hall, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html [https://perma.cc/9
KX6-HGXD]; Laura King, What Was Life Like in Syria’s Raqqah, the Fallen Capital of
Islamic State’s Caliphate? L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://www.
latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-raqqah-backgrounder-20171017-story.html
[https://perma.cc/95M9-M8GB].
45 Gil Avriel, Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield, 7 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 199, 214 (2016).
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“brutality and bureaucracy,” as it mastered not only terror but
also government administration, in some instances through
subverting existing government institutions.46 Nonetheless, in
the eyes of the global community, ISIS remained a terrorist nonstate actor, rather than a legitimate state. Therefore, terror nonstate is an accurate descriptor of the entity that ISIS formed.
Both in size and aspiration, terror non-states are more than just
safe havens, they are spaces in which terrorist groups assert
authority over the governed and seek to supplant the state.47
In violently supplanting the state and nullifying citizens’
sovereign rights, terror non-states reject human rights and
subvert the rule of law. ISIS has subverted the rule of law in
Iraq and Syria, by denying the citizens falling under its control
recourse to their sovereign institutions.48 On June 29, 2014, ISIS
achieved its aspiration and announced the creation of a
caliphate, a political entity in which ISIS’ interpretation of
Islamic law is enforced.49 The territory that it took in Iraq and
Syria became a space for ISIS leaders to assert their governance
philosophy over a wide territorial region and over a significant
population.50 ISIS asserted its authority over its forced
population through cruel internal security measures that
enforced its harsh vision of religious law.51 The enforcement
measures were their harsh interpretation of 1,400 year old rules
stemming from the time of their prophet, whose caliphate they
sought to emulate.52 At its high point, ISIS is estimated to have
controlled close to one-third of Syria and one-third of Iraq—an

Callimachi, supra note 44.
The term terrorist “safe haven” fails to fully “capture[ ] . . . the magnitude
[ ] or the severity” of modern-day terrorist strong holds in the Middle East and Africa.
Avriel, supra note 45, at 211–14, 216. Avriel has his own nomenclature for this
phenomenon. He refers to the strongholds as “terroristates.” Id. at 216. I believe that the
term “terrorist non-state” more fully reflects the international legal status of the terrorist
groups forming these strongholds.
48 See, e.g., Callimachi, supra note 44 (discussing how ISIS took control of
certain government agencies in Baghdad, closed others, and operated existing agencies
and new administrative entities under its interpretation of Islamic law).
49 See Matt Bradley, ISIS Declares New Islamist Caliphate: Militant Group
Declares Statehood, Demands Allegiance From Other Organizations, WALL ST. J. (June
29, 2014, 2:07 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate1404065263 [https://perma.cc/L8V9-8WK3].
50 See Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/
[https://perma.cc/J6EF-K992].
51 See Andrew F. March and Mara Revkin, Caliphate of Law, FOREIGN
AFF. (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphatelaw [https://perma.cc/3ANE-6NMC].
52 See id.
46
47
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area the size of Britain—and to have exerted control over ten to
twelve million people.53
ISIS governs its forced subjects under a legal and
regulatory framework much different than the constitutional
and code-based regimes in place in Iraq and Syria. ISIS governs
under a legal and statecraft framework based upon its
interpretation of Islamic materials.54 ISIS has avoided codifying
laws and constitutions to avoid the construct of modern nationstates and instead has opted for the enforcement of Islamic law
by judges in sharia courts.55
[T]he ISIS judiciary is organized into three main branches: a division
for complaints (mazalim), including grievances against ISIS public
officials and combatants; Islamic courts . . . which deal[ ] with
violations of ISIS laws and government matters; and the Diwan alHisba [division] which adjudicates crimes or misconduct referred by
the morality police.56

ISIS also believes that the caliph has the authority to issue rules
and regulations under an Islamic theory of governance, siyasa
shar’iyya, which translates to “religiously legitimate governance.”57
For regulatory issues not addressed in Islamic criminal and civil
law enforced through sharia courts, ISIS has established a
regulatory governance system. The caliph and governors, military
commanders, and market inspectors under him issue binding
decisions on everything from traffic fines and taxes to military
discipline, education, and property expropriation.58 Two different
police units were responsible for enforcing criminal and moral
law.59 The “Islamic police” were responsible for law enforcement
and public safety, while the hisba police were responsible for
enforcing morals, promoting virtue and preventing vice.60 Some of
the responsibilities of the hisba police included “responding to
reports of drug or alcohol use, and destroying banned [items]” such
as “musical instruments, cigarettes [and] polytheistic idols.”61
ISIS’ violent takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria
abrogated human rights and the rule of law in several respects.
53 Patrick Cockburn, War With ISIS: Islamic Militants Have an Army of 200,000
Claims Senior Kurdish Leader, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 16, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-islamic-militants-have-army-of-200
000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html [https://perma.cc/NCE5-WHHS].
54 See March & Revkin, supra note 51.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
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It imposed a system of governance over the objection of its
subjects, denied citizens access to their sovereign rights and
institutions, and it flouted international human rights law by
committing some of the worst forms of human rights abuse
imaginable.62 ISIS violently subjected Iraqis and Syrians to its
control without their consent. ISIS has not honored nor
respected the sovereign rights of its subjects, nor the institutions
under which they were previously governed.63 Governance under
the Iraqi and Syrian governments was not without privation.
Assad regime abuses against Syrian citizens and Iraqi
government dysfunction created the security vacuum that ISIS
exploited in both countries.64 Nonetheless, the human rights
violations under ISIS arguably outstripped those that existed in
post-Sadaam Iraq or pre-civil war Syria.65 ISIS used public
beheadings, mass executions, slave markets, widespread sexual
slavery, and other gruesome techniques to enforce their rigid
views, such as the immolation of a Jordanian pilot.66 ISIS rulings
determined that Yazidis as a group could be executed, as
Yazidism was deemed a polytheistic religion, and also
determined that Yazidi and other captured women could
permissibly be held as sexual slaves by law.67 These extensive
human rights violations fly in the face of every modern
understanding of the human rights to which all human beings are
entitled, including the right to life and freedom of religion, as well
as universal prohibitions against slavery, torture, and sexual
exploitation.68 ISIS officials themselves are not immune from
abuse; ISIS judges have disappeared for protesting the torture of
prisoners and have been executed on charges of treason and
collaboration with foreign governments.69
See Sourgens, supra note 34, at 379–82.
ISIS has dismantled existing institutions and ignored pre-existing legal
frameworks. See id. at 379.
64 Jason Hanna, Here’s How ISIS Was Really Founded, CNN (Aug. 13, 2016, 2:05
PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L28D-F59F].
65 This article does not suggest that the Assad regime’s pre-civil conflict activity or
ongoing actions do not comprise severe human rights violations themselves. In fact, the Assad
regime’s behavior over the course of the civil war undoubtedly constitutes substantial,
ongoing human rights violations. See VIOLATIONS DOCUMENTATION CTR. IN SYRIA, SPECIAL
REPORT ON COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW NO. 19 AND THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COURT IN SYRIA:
COUNTER-TERRORISM COURT: A TOOL FOR WAR CRIMES (2015), http://www.vdc-sy.info/pdf/
reports/1430186775-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB8N-GVPM].
66 See March & Revkin, supra note 51; see also van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 536.
67 See March & Revkin, supra note 51; see also COCKBURN, supra note 40, at 388–89.
68 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec.
16, 1966); G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984).
69 See March & Revkin, supra note 51.
62

63
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Boko Haram

Like ISIS, Boko Haram has established a terror nonstate. Boko Haram, which means “Western Civilization Is
Forbidden,” is a terror group that emerged in Nigeria in the
early 2000s, whose aim is to establish an Islamic state governed
by its interpretation of Sharia Law in Nigeria.70 Boko Haram has
staged attacks against the government and civilians primarily
in the poor, predominately Muslim northeastern part of Nigeria,
motivated by concerns that the moderate Muslim government
was not being run consistently with its view of an Islamic State.71
In 2014, Boko Haram surpassed ISIS as “the world’s deadliest
terrorist group” with 7,500 deaths that year.72 From 2009 to
2015, Boko Haram was responsible for an estimated fifteen
thousand deaths.73 Boko Haram’s brutal killing of fifty college
students as they slept in their dormitory beds received global
media coverage.74 Similarly, Boko Haram’s abduction of nearly
three hundred schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, in 2014 drew
international attention, sparking the #BringBackOurGirls
social media movement and intervention from the Obama
Administration.75 In May 2017, negotiations led by Switzerland
and the International Committee for the Red Cross resulted in
the release of eighty-two school girls; however, hundreds of
girls—including the remaining Chibok girls and over five
hundred girls kidnapped from Damask, Borno—remained in
Boko Haram’s custody as of late 2017.76
By early 2014, Boko Haram expanded from terrorist
attacks and began to take territory in Northern Nigeria. By
early 2015, Boko Haram held control over roughly 20,000 square
70 See INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON COUNTRY INFORMATION, HOME
OFFICE, COUNTRY INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NIGERIA: FEAR OF BOKO HARAM, 20156, at 5, 10 (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/566195/CIG_NIG_Fear_of_Boko_Haram.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG6Q-22EW].
“Books are banned” would be a literal translation of Boko Haram. Boko means “book” in
the Hausa language. David Blair, Boko Haram Is Now a Mini-Islamic State, with Its
Own Territory, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 10 2015, 6:55 PM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-miniIslamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html [https://perma.cc/JT6K-XGLR].
71 LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43558, NIGERIA’S
BOKO HARAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2016).
72 Id. at 5.
73 Id.
74 See e.g., Nigeria Attack: Students Shot Dead As They Slept, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24322683 [https://perma.cc/7MR6-G5PK].
75 See BLANCHARD supra note 71, at 7–8; see also HELON HABILA, THE CHIBOK
GIRLS: THE BOKO HARAM KIDNAPPINGS AND ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN NIGERIA 96
(Columbia Glob. Reports 2016).
76 World Report 2018: Nigeria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2018/country-chapters/nigeria [https://perma.cc/CTU4-6V2Y].
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miles, “an area the size of Belgium,” and over 1.7 million
people.77 By March 2015, Boko Haram’s self-proclaimed leader,
Abubakr Shekau, pledged his fealty to ISIS and declared his
territory an Islamic state, under the ISIS caliphate.78 Boko
Haram largely funds itself through theft, extortion, and slave
raids, including the Chibok girls, whom Shekau admits were
sold into slavery.79 Boko Haram is a criminal enterprise as well
as a jihadist terror group—it engages in widespread terror
attacks in Nigeria, and across the border to neighboring states,
utilizing improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers,
including women and children.80 Boko Haram has engaged in
attacks within Nigeria and across the Nigerian border in
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.81 Forty-one percent of Boko Haramrelated attacks in 2014 were carried out by female suicide
bombers, many of whom were coerced, and unsuspecting
children under the age of eighteen.82
Shekau controls Boko Haram through his leadership of a
shura council, a consultative body of senior Boko Haram
officials.83 In March 2015, Shekau pledged his allegiance to ISIS
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and that support is seen as part of
Boko Haram’s motivation to take territory and declare itself part
of the ISIS caliphate.84 Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS
was seen as a precursor to Boko Haram’s establishment of sharia
courts and a system of governance modeled after ISIS’ system in
Iraq and Syria.85 In 2017, Shekau stated his intention to
implement sharia law in Nigeria, Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger
and Mali, establishing a West African caliphate.86
Boko Haram, like ISIS, violates the rule of law and human
rights, and in many ways Boko Haram’s values are antithetical to
77 See Blair, supra note 70 (“Boko Haram controls about 20,000 square miles
of territory—an area the size of Belgium.”); see also Intel Brief, supra note 28.
78 See Sarah Almukhtar, How Boko Haram Courted and Joined the Islamic State,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/11/world/africa/bokoharam-isis-propaganda-video-nigeria.html [https://perma.cc/VD8Q-XZFT]; BLANCHARD, supra
note 71, at 6.
79 BLANCHARD, supra note 71, at 7–8, 17.
80 Id. at 3–4.
81 Cristina Silva, Boko Haram Vows to Impose Sharia Law in Nigeria, Benin,
Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 20, 2017, 12:39 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/boko-haram-vows-impose-sharia-law-nigeria-benin-cameroon-chadniger-and-571054 [https://perma.cc/A28X-6G5X].
82 BLANCHARD, supra note 71, at 9.
83 BLANCHARD, supra note 71, at 4.
84 Nima Elbagir, Paul Cruickshank, & Mohammed Tawfeeq, Boko Haram
Purportedly Pledges Allegiance to ISIS, CNN (Mar. 9, 2015, 10:39 AM ET), http://www.
cnn.com/2015/03/07/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-isis/ [https://perma.cc/P947-PZ8Y].
85 See March & Revkin, supra note 51.
86 Silva, supra note 81.
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modern understandings of the rule of law and human rights.
Modern conceptions of the rule of law and human rights have
evolved from global experiences of genocide, war, deprivation, and
wide scale oppression.87 However, the conception of governance and
law that Boko Haram and ISIS force on their subjects is a strict
(and widely disputed) conception of Islamic law that enables
violations of human rights that the global community has
uniformly denounced. For example, like ISIS, Boko Haram believes
that the kidnapping and sexual exploitation of women and girls is
permitted under their interpretation of Islamic law, along with the
slaughter of women, children, and civilians that do not subscribe to
their belief systems, which include people of other religious
backgrounds and Muslim alike.88 Despite the widespread attention
that followed the Chibok girls’ kidnapping, Boko Haram’s targeting
of children has continued. UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund,
reported that in 2017 “[eighty-three] children were used as suicide
bombers [by Boko Haram]; [fifty-five] girls and [twenty-seven]
boys, one was a baby strapped to a girl.”89
According to Human Rights Watch, “[o]ver 180 civilians
have been killed in suicide bomb attacks since late 2016, mostly
in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital.”90 During 2017, Boko
Haram engaged in suicide attacks at universities, markets and
displacement camps, killing at least three hundred civilians and
87 For example, the modern United Nations and human rights system arose
out of the global community’s response to World War II Nazi war abuses and its
extermination campaign against the Jewish community. Human rights leaders and
advocates from around the world used the creation of the United Nations as an
opportunity to define a human rights system that would limit sovereign states’ ability to
engage in wide-scale oppression of their citizens. See, e.g., Darin E.W. Johnson, How U.S.
Civil Rights Leaders’ Human Rights Agenda Shaped the United Nations, 1 HOW. HUM.
& C.R. L. REV. 33, 34 (2017).
88 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, OUR JOB IS TO SHOOT, SLAUGHTER AND KILL:
BOKO HARAM’S REIGN OF TERROR IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA 5 (2015) https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1360/2015/en/ [https://perma.cc/FP9V-Q5XK]
(“Some specific individuals or categories of civilians were deliberately targeted. Boko
Haram fighters killed politicians, civil servants, teachers, health workers and traditional
leaders because of their relationship with secular authority. Boko Haram called them
‘unbelievers.’ Christians living in the north-east were included in this category, but so were
Islamic religious figures, from the leaders of sects to local Imams, if they publicly opposed
Boko Haram or failed to follow the group’s teachings. At times, Boko Haram gave such
individuals the option of converting, whether Christian or Muslim, instead of being
killed.”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THOSE TERRIBLE WEEKS IN THEIR CAMP”: BOKO
HARAM VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA 2 (2014), http://
features.hrw.org/features/HRW_2014_report/Those_Terrible_Weeks_in_Their_Camp/asse
ts/nigeria1014web.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEY5-DEX2] (“The women and girls told Human
Rights Watch that for refusing to convert to Islam, they and many others they saw in the
camps were subjected to physical and psychological abuse; forced labor; forced participation
in military operations, including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambush; forced
marriage to their captors; and sexual abuse, including rape.”).
89 World Report 2018: Nigeria, supra note 76.
90 Id.
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bringing the total eight-year civilian death toll to over twenty
thousand.91 Boko Haram has also targeted Christians,
beheading Christian men who refused to convert to Islam and
forcing their wives to convert and marry Boko Haram soldiers.92
These practices are clear violations of international human
rights law, and as discussed in Part VII, ISIS and Boko Haram
must be held accountable for them.
C.

Human Rights Law and Terror Non-States

This section will discuss the body of law known as
international human rights law and the ways in which terror
non-states systematically violate human rights. Human rights,
law as a body captures a broad range of civil and political rights,
such as the right to trial, freedom of expression, and freedom of
religion, as well as a number of economic, social and cultural
rights, such as the right to work, right to education, and right to
health.93 The enforcement of human rights law against non-state
actors such as ISIS exposes a gap in the current framework.
International human rights law evolved as a system of law that
codifies and protects the rights of individuals against states.
Sovereign states signal their willingness to ensure that human
rights are protected through their ratification of the United
Nations Charter—a binding treaty that calls upon states to
“respect[ ] ” and “promot[e]” human rights.94 Sovereign states
also signal their commitment to protect human rights through
their ratification of human rights treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN
Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which have near
universal ratification.95 Parties to these treaties commit to codify

Id.
Jack Moore, Nigeria: Boko Haram Declares Sharia Law, Beheads Christian
Men and Forces Women into Islam in Gwoza, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014, 16:51 BST),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nigeria-boko-haram-declares-sharia-law-beheads-christian-men
-forces-women-into-islam-gwoza-1463185 [https://perma.cc/934A-YJHL].
93 See G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 68, at arts. 9 ¶ 3, 18 ¶ 1, 19 ¶ 2; G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 6
¶ 1, 12 ¶ 1, 13 ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
94 U.N. Charter, arts. 1, ¶ 3, 55; van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 550.
95 For a listing of all human rights treaties’ ratification status, see Status of
Ratification Interactive-Dashboard, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R,
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ [https://perma.cc/D25C-CW9J].
91
92
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the rights in their domestic law, enforce the rights, and provide
a judicial remedy if the rights are violated.96
Sovereign states are responsible for ensuring that
international human rights laws are protected within their
territory. Their ability to enforce these rights, however, is
frustrated in circumstances where terror non-states take their
territory. Iraq and Syria are both parties to several human
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child—
however, state sovereigns are unable to enforce these treaty
obligations where ISIS has taken up control.97 Human rights
belong to the people, and successor governments are obligated to
protect those human rights even if the treaties were adopted by
a predecessor regime.98 Terror non-states present a unique
challenge to the enforcement of human rights law because they
are not legitimate successor governments and therefore do not
have obligations to enforce treaty law, but they have asserted
the authority to govern thousands of citizens falling under their
control.99 Further, a sovereign state’s loss of territory to a terror
non-state renders impracticable its ability to enforce the
protection of human rights.

96 See, e.g., G.A. Res 2200A, supra note 68, at art. 2 (pursuant to which StateParties commit “to take the necessary steps . . . to adopt such legislative or other measures
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized” in the treaty; “to ensure . . . an
effective remedy” for violations before “competent judicial, administrative, or legislative
authorities”; and “[t]o ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies”).
97 It should be noted that even before ISIS took control of territory in Syria,
the Assad regime was guilty of massive human rights violations against the Syrian
people, which increased with his attacks against the peaceful Arab spring protesters and
the Syrian opposition movement. See VIOLATIONS DOCUMENTATION CTR. IN SYRIA, supra
note 65, at 1–3. For the full list of human rights treaties to which Iraq and Syria are
party, see U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx [https://perma.cc/D933-MJH5].
98 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment on Issues Relating
to the Continuity of Obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, [para. 4], U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) [hereinafter
U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment], https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2F21%2FRev.1%2FAdd.8
%2FRev.1&Lang=en [https://perma.cc/P3V7-JB9K] (“The rights enshrined in the
Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of the State Party. The Human
Rights Committee has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing
practice, that once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the
Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them,
notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment in
more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the State party
designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant.”).
99 van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 553.
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Terror non-states undoubtedly are subject to customary
international law and cannot violate the jus cogens (universal)
human rights of their subjects such as the freedom from slavery,
torture, and genocide.100 Given the wide-ranging nature of terror
non-states’ governance, however, I would posit that the
international community adopt a norm that terror non-states
that take territory and claim the authority to govern have a legal
obligation to observe jus cogens human rights and all treatybased human rights to which citizens are entitled—and that
terror non-state officials will be held criminally accountable for
the violation of those rights.101 Further, I recommend that the
UN Security Council pass a resolution determining that all nonstate actors, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, that take territorial
control from sovereign states are obligated to protect the human
rights—treaty-based and customary—of all subject citizens
during the period of their control.102 The enforcement of
international human rights law against terror non-states and
accountability are discussed in Part VII. Terror non-states can also
be held to account by military force. The next Part discusses the
justifications under international law for military intervention
against terror non-states.
IV.

INTERVENING AGAINST TERROR NON-STATES

The legal justification for an international military
response against terror non-states is complicated by their status
100 Jus Cogens is “a peremptory norm of general international law . . . accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344. “[P]eremptory norms that are . . . recognized
include the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes
against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.” Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N
85,U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts].
101 Discussed infra Part VII.
102 Some members of the NGO Human Rights community agree with this
proposition. See Matt Edbrooke, Enforcing a ‘Universal’ Declaration: UN Efforts to Hold
Non-State Actors Accountable for Human Rights, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (July 20,
2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/enforcing-a-universal-declaration-un-efforts-to-hold-nonstate-actors-accountable-for-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/59EP-T2ZD] (“[T]he statebased manner in which human rights are protected in the UN system is found wanting
in the modern world. Whilst focusing on the state allows one to show which actor is
responsible at the UN level for any violation of human rights, it often fails to directly
hold the actor committing the human rights violation to account, when the applicable
state cannot itself do so. This is particularly problematic when the non-state actor meets
a standard of ‘effective control’ over citizens or territory, making it the de facto guarantor
of human rights. The absence of domestic or international human rights mechanisms to
hold de facto human rights guarantors to account presents an enforcement gap in the
UN human rights system that requires addressing.”).
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as non-state actors. The law governing armed military
intervention, known as jus ad bellum, or the “right to war,” is a
subset of international law. The modern framework for jus ad
bellum is laid out in the Charter of the United Nations. The
Charter provides that a state may use force against another state
in self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council in
response to a threat to international peace and security.103
However, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter also provides that a
member state’s territory is inviolable and shall not be infringed
unless authorized by the Security Council104 or in self-defense.105
The collective security model reflected in the UN Charter was
devised to deter state to state aggression of the kind experienced
in the two world wars at the start of the twentieth century.106 The
state-centric framework of the UN Charter, however, does not
explicitly address the particularities of a foreign state’s military
response to attacks from a non-state actor.
Illustrations are instructive in outlining the intricacies of
territorial sovereignty, self-defense, state attribution, and
intervention against non-state actors. In a traditional state-state
conflict, the territorial sovereignty of State A gives way to the right
to self-defense of State B if State B can justify its actions based on
the conduct of State A. However, the calculus changes if Non-State
Actor C in State A attacks State B, and State A objects to State B’s
military response within its territory. State B does not necessarily
have the right to contravene the territory of State A due to the
actions of Non-State Actor C. State A can invite State B to
militarily intervene against Non State Actor C, thus consenting to
State B’s actions and avoiding a violation of its territorial
sovereignty (this is the Iraq/ISIL/U.S. scenario discussed below).107
But if State A does not consent to State B’s intervention against
Non-State Actor C, the calculation becomes more complicated. If
State B can show that State A exercises “effective control”108 over
103 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”). Article 42 states that the Security Council
“may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 42; see also van der Vyver,
supra note 37, at 545.
104 U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 4, 42.
105 Id. at art. 51.
106 Id. at pmbl. (“[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”); see also Peace
and Security, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peaceand-security [https://perma.cc/9YCT-LMLP].
107 van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 553–54.
108 The “effective control” test was developed in the International Court of Justice’s
Nicaragua case to ascertain when a state can be held responsible for the actions of a non-state
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the actions of Non-State Actor C, then State B can act in selfdefense against Non-State Actor C and State A without violating
international law. This is analogous to the scenario that unfolded
after 9/11. The United States intervened militarily in self-defense
against Al Qaeda and set out to remove Afghanistan’s ruling
Taliban regime, which, in the view of the United States, bore
responsibility for Al Qaeda’s actions.109 In such a scenario, the
conduct of the non-state actor is attributed to the host state and a
foreign state may act in self-defense against both.110
Terror non-states such as ISIS and Boko Haram,
however, seek the overthrow of their host state governments and
it would be illogical to attribute their conduct to the regimes with
which they are at war. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has ruled that the use of force against a state for the nonattributable conduct of a non-state actor within its territory is
not authorized under international law.111 In the Armed
Activities Case on the Territory of Congo, the ICJ determined
that Uganda was not legally justified in taking military action
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s territory against
insurgents whose actions were not attributable to the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s government.112 In the absence of
host state consent, an intervening state must formulate a legal
justification for the violation of the host state’s territorial
actor. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27). (The United States was determined not to have
effective control over Nicaraguan armed groups to which it supplied weapons because it did not
control their conduct.); see also Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, supra note 100, at art. 8 cmt. 1; van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 553–54.
109 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224–25 (2001).
110 An analogous scenario would arise when a state contravenes another state’s
territory to act in self-defense against a non-state actor that it is harboring, such as the
U.S. military raid against Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. There is significant debate as
to whether the government of Pakistan knowingly harbored Bin Laden, but it is clear
from the diplomatic fallout after the raid that Pakistan did not consent to the raid, as it
was unaware that it had taken place until after it was complete. The U.S. government
maintains that its brief intrusion into Pakistan’s territory was authorized by its right to
self-defense and to militarily respond against the master mind behind 9/11. It is difficult
to argue that other states would not behave similarly under similar circumstances.
Husain Haqqani, What Pakistan Knew About the Bin Laden Raid, FOREIGN POL’Y, (May
13, 2015; 2:25 PM) http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/13/what-pakistan-knew-about-thebin-laden-raid-seymour-hersh/ [https://perma.cc/JN9S-LQ35].
111 Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15, 36–37 (2016) (noting that “[t]he rationale behind the attribution
requirement is that a state cannot be held responsible for the acts of all whose activities
originate in its territory” and citing the ICJ rulings in the Oil Platforms, Nicaragua, Wall
Advisory Opinion, and Congo cases).
112 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 141–47, 165 (Dec. 19, 2005); see also Jörg
Kammerhofer, The Armed Activities Case and Non-State Actors in Self-Defence Law, 20
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 89, 96 (2007).
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sovereignty in order to attack a non-state actor operating within
the host state.113 This scenario unfolded when the United States
sought to intervene militarily against ISIS in the territory of
Syria over the Syrian government’s objection.114
When ISIS overtook Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city in
2014, it secured hundreds of millions of dollars from banks, as
well as tanks and military equipment (much of it U.S.-issued),
from the Iraqi army which left Mosul without a fight.115 ISIS
used its new found wealth and equipment to take territory in
Iraq and Syria.116 In the midst of the ISIS rampage through Iraq,
several humanitarian crises unfolded. One of these crises was
ISIS’ targeted killing of Yazidi Christians in Northern Iraq,
where ISIS soldiers killed thousands of Yazidi men and sold
thousands of Yazidi women and children into sexual slavery.117
ISIS trapped 30,000 Yazidis on Mount Sinjar with no point of
egress, and no capacity to obtain additional food or water.118 As
their supplies dwindled, President Obama ordered airstrikes
against ISIS to prevent a humanitarian disaster, stating that
“[w]hen we have the unique capacity to avert a massacre, the
United States cannot turn a blind eye.”119 The United States
undertook this airstrike for humanitarian purposes without
Iraqi government invitation.120 Several days after the airstrike,
however, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki left office and the new
Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi invited the United States to
conduct an extensive military airstrike campaign against ISIS

See van der Vyver, supra note 37, at 557–58.
See id.; see also discussion infra Part V.
115 Martin
Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of
Mosul, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014, 15:51 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-seize-control-mosul. [https://perma.cc/
Q2QE-RJPU]; Agence France-Presse, ISIS Captured 2,300 Humvee Armoured Vehicles from
Iraq Forces, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/isiscaptured-2300-humvee-armoured-vehicles-from-iraqi-forces-in-mosul [https://perma.cc/D648
-2EMZ]; Fantz, supra note 40.
116 See Chulov, supra note 115.
117 See Steve Hopkins, Full Horror of the Yazidis Who Didn’t Escape Mount
Sinjar: UN Confirms 5,000 Men Were Executed and 7,000 Women Are Now Kept as Sex
Slaves, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 14, 2014, 7:09 PM EDT), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2792552/full-horror-yazidis-didn-t-escape-mount-sinjar-confirms-5-000-men-exe
cuted-7-000-women-keptsex-slaves.html [https://perma.cc/67VE-DU6U].
118 Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, Militants Siege on Mountain in Iraq is
Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/
world/middleeast/iraq-yazidi-refugees.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MD94-97L7]; see also
Scharf, supra note 111, at 22.
119 Helene Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighsmilitary-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/NSL8-CDRE].
120 See Scharf, supra note 111, at 22.
113

114
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in Iraq, called operation Inherent Resolve.121 The campaign
began in August 2014 and France and Britain joined the
campaign within a matter of weeks.122
While the legal justification for the U.S. military
campaign against ISIS in Iraq was consent-based, no such
consent existed in Syria. The Assad regime, which had engaged
in a civil war against its citizens since 2011, expressly opposed
any U.S. military intervention, even against ISIS and not the
Syrian government, as a violation of its sovereignty.123 U.S.
efforts to obtain a Security Council resolution to enable
intervention in Syria had been thwarted by Russia, a patron of
Syria for years.124 By 2014, ISIS had taken advantage of the
Syrian civil war and the security vacuum to expand its territory
in Syria.125 Without a Security Council Resolution or a Syrian
invitation, U.S. military action against ISIS required an
alternate justification. A self-defense theory or humanitarian
intervention appeared to be the only available options. The
United States began airstrikes against ISIS in Syria under a
theory of self-defense on behalf of Iraq.126 Because the air
campaign in Iraq had been undertaken to defend the Iraqi
government against ISIS, the United States argued that it would
need to pursue ISIS into its new stronghold in Syria in order to
defend the Iraqi people. The September 23, 2014 letter from
Samantha Power, United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, laid out this legal justification for action:
Iraq has made clear that it is facing a serious threat of continuing
attacks from ISIL coming out of safe havens in Syria. These safe
121 See CLAIRE MILLS ET AL., ISIS/DAESH: THE MILITARY RESPONSE IN IRAQ AND
SYRIA 6 (HC Library, Briefing Paper No. 06995 2015), http://club.bruxelles2.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/OperMilitDaechIrakSyrieRap@UK151203.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DY5P-NWAK]; see also Scharf, supra note 111, at 22.
122 See BEN SMITH, ISIS AND THE SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 51,
52 HC Library, Research Paper 15/16, 2015), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/RP15-16/RP15-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DKW-QR2Z]; see also van der Vyver,
supra note 37, at 554; Scharf, supra note 111, at 22.
123 See Ian Black & Dan Roberts, ISIS Air Strikes: Obama’s Plan Condemned by
Syria, Russia and Iran, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014, 2:42 PM EDT), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/assad-moscow-tehran-condemn-obama-isis-air-strike-plan
[https://perma.cc/22Y9-DYJ4]; Scharf, supra note 111, at 17; Syrian Foreign Minister Warns
Against Airstrikes, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.thenational.ae/world/syrianforeign-minister-warns-against-airstrikes-1.473417 [https://perma.cc/3E6S-QGWE].
124 See Colum Lynch, Why Putin Is So Committed to Keeping Assad in Power,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 7, 2015, 2:34 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/putinsrussia-is-wedded-to-bashar-al-assad-syria-moscow/ [https://perma.cc/QFE6-HZZD]; see
also Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, From Al-Qaida in 2001 to ISIL in 2015: The Security
Council’s Decisions on Terrorism and Their Impact on the Right to Self-Defense Against
Autonomous Non-State Actors, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 345, 402 (2017).
125 GERGES, supra note 27, at 175–77.
126 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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havens are used by ISIL for training, planning, financing, and
carrying out attacks across Iraqi borders and against Iraq’s people.
For these reasons, the Government of Iraq has asked that the United
States lead international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military
strongholds in Syria in order to end the continuing attacks on Iraq, to
protect Iraqi citizens, and ultimately to enable and arm Iraqi forces to
perform their task of regaining control of the Iraqi borders.
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq,
but also to many other countries, including the United States and our
partners in the region and beyond. States must be able to defend
themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 if [sic] the UN
Charter, when, as is the case here, the government of the State where
the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its
territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot
and will not confront these safe-havens effectively itself. Accordingly,
the United States has initiated necessary and proportionate military
actions in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing ISIL threat to Iraq,
including by protecting Iraqi citizens from further attacks and by
enabling Iraqi forces to regain control of Iraq’s borders.127

This self-defense theory enabled the United States to
engage in a military campaign against a non-state actor, in a
state not attributed with the non-state actor’s conduct, over the
express opposition of that state to violation of its territory.
Michael Scharf has referred to the United States’ airstrikes in
Syria as the final of many state actions, including the U.S.
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the
international community’s response to ISIS’ October 2015
bombing of a Russian airliner and November 2015 attack on a
Paris stadium, that crystallized the unable or unwilling
standard into a new rule.128 Scharf asserts that these state
actions have created a new rule of customary international law
where a state no longer has to effectively control the conduct of
a non-state actor on its territory before legally becoming subject
to an unconsented military intervention.129 Instead, the state
merely has to be “unable or unwilling” to control the behavior of
the non-state actor.130 The Security Council effectively endorsed
this rule with its passage of Resolution 2249, which declared
127 Marty Lederman, The War Powers Resolution and Article 51 Letters
Concerning Use of Force in Syria Against ISIL and the Khorasan Group, JUST SECURITY
(Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-article-51letters-force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/ [https://perma.cc/D6KA-58P2] (referring to
Samantha Powers letter to Secretary General of the U.N. Ban Ki-Moon); see also van der
Vyver, supra note 37, at 558.
128 See Scharf, supra note 111, at 64–66.
129 Id. at 66–67.
130 Id. at 47–48, 64–66 (discussing how the Obama doctrine adopted the “unable
and unwilling” formulation of the Bush Administration to justify its drone targeting
program); see also Hakimi, supra note 41, at 8.
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ISIS “a global and unprecedented threat to international peace
and security” and called upon states to take “all necessary
measures” to “eradicate the safe haven” of ISIS in Syria.131 The
resolution did not explicitly authorize military action under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter against ISIS but the French
Security Council Representative who authored the resolution
explained that collective action could now be based on the selfdefense provision of the UN Charter Article 51, which provides
that “[n]othing in the . . . Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations.”132
Some scholars have argued that a new standard for
interpreting self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter is
emerging, where states that are “unwilling or unable” to prevent
non state-actors in their territory from aggressing against other
states, are subject to self-defensive intervention from the states
that have been attacked.133 A TWAIL-inspired critique levied
against this theory of self-defense is that the new standard is
inconsistent with historic understandings of self-defense under
Article 51 and reflects American and Western attempts to flout
the constraints of Article 51 at the expense of the sovereignty of
states of the “Global South.”134 Even if this critique is accurate
that this self-defense theory is more frequently used by powerful
states against weak states, from a liberation and protection
perspective, the more important consideration is whether this
theory of self-defense is necessary to protect vulnerable
populations. In the case of Syria, the answer is undoubtedly yes;
the Syrian government under Asaad was loath to allow any
foreign incursion into its territory—even to defeat one of its
enemies. Nonetheless, an oppressive dictator such as Asaad,
who is both unwilling and unable to prevent ISIS attacks on
foreign states, should not be able to prevent strikes by those
states in self-defense against ISIS, particularly if those strikes

S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 41, at ¶¶ 1, 5.
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council “Unequivocally”
Condemns ISIL Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting Text that Determines
Extremist Group Poses “Unprecedented” Threat, U.N. Press Release SC/12132, (Nov. 20,
2015) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release SC/12132], http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/
sc12132.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/9DB8-TP46]; see also van der Vyver, supra note 37, at
545 (discussing art. 51 of the U.N. Charter).
133 See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 486 (2012).
134 See Ntina Tzouvala, TWAIL and the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine:
Continuities and Ruptures, 109 AM. J. INT’L L UNBOUND 266, 266 (2016).
131

132
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are conducted in a manner that liberates rather than worsens
the situation of vulnerable populations.135
The complex implications of a legal norm of self-defense
that would allow external states to take military action against
terror non-states over the objection of the host state can be seen
in the case of Boko Haram.136 In addition to engaging in terror
attacks against the Nigerian people, Boko Haram has also
staged terror attacks against Nigerian border-states in the Lake
Chad region, including Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Cameroon
has faced the most attacks—more than eighty suicide bombings
in 2015, resulting in at least 1,200 deaths.137 In 2014, the African
Union (AU), a regional organization consisting of fifty-five
African States,138 authorized a Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) under the umbrella of the Lake Chad Basin
Commission (Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger) along with
Benin, to confront Boko Haram.139 The AU Peace and Security
Council authorized the MNJTF to “conduct military operations
to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist
groups, and to eliminate their presence.”140 Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter provides that “[t]he Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilize . . . regional arrangements or agencies for
enforcement action under its authority,” but that “no enforcement
action shall be taken . . . by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council.”141 The Charter permits
regional arrangements for “matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action,” but requires that any action of a regional
agency be “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.”142 In short, although regional agencies may
135 Airstrikes result in civilian casualties. All Feasible Precautions? Civilian
Casualties in the Anti-ISIS Coalition Airstrikes in Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 24,
2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/24/all-feasible-precautions/civilian-casualtiesanti-isis-coalition-airstrikes-syria [https://perma.cc/ZD69-BCXP]. Any air campaign that
aims to liberate vulnerable populations must be carried out in a manner that minimizes
such casualties.
136 See Alvarez-Jimenez, supra note 124, at 415–16.
137 See BLANCHARD, supra note71, at 11.
138 Member
State Profiles, AFRICAN UNION https://au.int/memberstates
[https://perma.cc/5PNL-LFCF].
139 See Press Release, African Union, Peace and Security Council, Communiqué
of the 484th Meeting at the Level of Head of State and Government (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-484th-meeting-of-the-psc-on-theboko-haram-terrorist-group [https://perma.cc/BTN2-GHA9]; see also Stephen Kingah &
Eva Seiwert, The Contested Emerging International Norm and Practice of A Responsibility
to Protect: Where Are Regional Organizations?, 42 N.C. J. INT’L L. 115, 139 (2016).
140 See Press Release, African Union, Peace and Security Council, supra note
139; see also Kingah & Seiwert, supra note 139, at 139.
141 U.N. Charter art. 53, ¶ 1.
142 Id. at art. 52, ¶ 1.
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engage in military intervention, they must do so only with the
authorization of the UN Security Council or in self-defense, as
laid out in the UN Charter.
Since the UN Security Council had not authorized the AU
MNJTF to use force at the time of its establishment, foreign states
participating in the MNJTF could only take military action in
Nigeria’s territory with Nigeria’s consent or in self-defense. Many
of the members of the Task Force had previously been involved in
border disputes with Nigeria, and Nigeria was reluctant to allow
foreign troops from these states to combat Boko Haram within
Nigerian territory.143 Chadian forces had entered Nigeria’s
territory without consent several times to battle Boko Haram in
the months prior to the establishment of the MNJTF.144 Although
the Task Force was headquartered in Chad under the leadership
of a Nigerian military commander, Nigeria remained reluctant to
allow foreign military intervention on its territory.145 Foreign
military operations currently occur under a range of bilateral
agreements in which the Nigerian government has consented to
the presence of foreign troops and seeks to maintain control over
them through its leadership of the MNJTF.146 Should Nigeria
revoke its consent to the foreign forces because of border or other
concerns, a self-defense justification would be the only legally
authorized option for Chad, Cameroon, and Niger to engage in
defensive action. However, if Nigeria is taking effective military
action against Boko Haram, foreign military intervention would
be difficult to legitimize under the “unwilling or unable” standard
reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2249.147
The Nigerian military response shows that it is willing
and able to respond to Boko Haram’s attacks in the country.
Since Boko Haram’s acts are not attributable to the government
of Nigeria, an “attribution” justification of self-defense is off the
table. If Nigeria’s military campaign against Boko Haram does
not prevent Boko Haram from engaging in attacks in
neighboring countries under the new rule developed for ISIS,
neighboring states may be justified in launching a limited and
targeted campaign against Boko Haram, even over the Nigerian
143 See Brandt Chu, The Forgotten Chapter: The Legality of Peacekeeping, Peace
Enforcement, and Military Intervention Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, 20 GONZ.
J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2016); see also Lynn L. Taylor, Boko Haram Terrorism: Reaching Across
International Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in the Humanitarian Crisis, 21 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 16 (2014).
144 Chu, supra note 143, at 12.
145 See Kingah & Seiwert, supra note 139, at 139.
146 Chu, supra note 143, at 13.
147 See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 41; see also discussion supra notes 130–134
and accompanying text.
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government’s objection. Such an approach would require a prior
armed attack against the nation by Boko Haram and notification
of that armed attack to the United Nations.148 The campaign
would be legitimated if the state is acting solely to protect
vulnerable populations in their own territories negatively
impacted by Boko Haram’s conduct, rather than based on some
other motive such as territorial incursion.149 The international
community may be loath to endorse such an approach, since it
would authorize incursions regardless of the sovereign state’s
wishes. Ultimately, the international community’s recognition of
a right to intervene against a non-state is likely to include
multiple considerations, including the scope of the attack
against the victim state, whether the sovereign is explicitly or
implicitly creating an environment that allows the terror nonstate to operate, and whether the sovereign government is
recognized as legitimate. Once a legal justification that authorizes
intervention has been proffered, a new legal framework governs
the conduct of the conflict.150
V.

BATTLING TERROR NON-STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW

When terror non-states become involved in armed
conflict, complex questions arise regarding the applicable legal
framework governing the conduct of hostilities between parties.
Jus in bello, also known as international humanitarian law,
governs the means and methods of warfare between parties.151
International humanitarian law is most significantly reflected
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although other treaties and
customary international law contribute to the body of law.152
148 U.N. Charter, art. 51, ¶ 1; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27, 1986).
149 Given the history of border disputes between Nigeria and its neighbors, a
regional military strategy, such as a MNJTF, is the better option and mitigates against
cross-state military interventions that devolve into pronounced state-state conflicts.
Nigeria’s longstanding border disputes with Chad and Cameroon in the Lake Chad basin
region where Boko Haram operates delayed this regional cooperation. See HENRIK
ANGERBRANDT, NORDIC AFRICA INST., POL’Y NOTE NO. 3:2017, NIGERIA AND THE LAKE
CHAD REGION BEYOND BOKO HARAM 5 (June 2017).
150 See discussion infra Part V.
151 The terms international humanitarian law, law of armed conflict, and law
of war are sometimes used interchangeably. This article uses the more specific term
international humanitarian law to refer to jus in bello, the law governing the means and
methods of war between parties. The law of armed conflict, also known as the law of war,
technically comprises both jus in bello and jus ad bellum, the right to wage war
(addressed supra in Section IV). See The Law of Armed Conflict, LEVIN INST.,
http://www.globalization101.org/law-of-armed-conflict/ [https://perma.cc/6NMQ-6DGS].
152 See The Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 151. International humanitarian
law includes inter alia the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs
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Within international humanitarian law, two types of armed
conflicts are understood to exist: international armed conflicts
and non-international armed conflicts (or internal armed
conflicts). Different rules govern the two types of conflicts.
Historically, domestic conflicts between host states and resident
non-state actors were understood to be governed by the laws of
non-international armed conflict; whereas conflicts between
states were governed by the laws of international armed
conflict.153 The status “non-state actor” has been applied to nongovernmental groups, and their supporters, engaged in noninternational (internal) conflicts with government combatants.154
International law scholar M. Cherif Bassiouni divides these nonstate actors into several categories:
(1) Regularly constituted groups of combatants with a military
command structure and a political structure;
(2) Non-regularly constituted groups of combatants with or without a
command structure and with or without a political hierarchical
structure;
(3) Spontaneously gathered groups who engage in combat or who
engage in sporadic acts of collective violence with or without a
command structure and with or without political leadership;
(4) Mercenaries acting as an autonomous group or as part of other
groups of combatants; and
(5) Expatriate volunteers who engage for a period of time in combat or
in support of combat operations, either as separate units or as part of
duly constituted or ad hoc units.155

Groups that are primarily organized for another purpose,
such as political parties or criminal enterprises, can also be
described as “non-state actors” if they are simultaneously
engaged in violence and hostilities.156

of War on Land, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions; and the two 1977 Geneva
Conventions Protocols; as well as customary norms relating to the law of armed conflict.
153 The 1949 Geneva Conventions were drafted to govern traditional state to
state international conflicts with uniformed forces, but Additional Protocol I was
completed in 1977 to address the increasing number of internal/non-international armed
conflicts, given the increase in internal conflicts/civil wars over the twentieth century.
See infra notes 161–167 and accompanying text.
154 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with
the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 715–
16 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
155 Id. at 715–16.
156 See id. at 715–17; see also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of NonState Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 237, 255 (2010).
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The challenge presented by terror non-states is that they
blur the distinctions between historic non-state actors and states.
Accordingly, determining whether terror non-states should be
governed by the law of international armed conflict or the law of
non-international armed conflict is challenging. Terror non-states
like ISIS and Boko Haram are non-state actors with regularly
constituted groups of combatants that fall under a military and
political structure, like the archetypical non-state actor identified
by Bassouini. However, terror non-states also conduct themselves
like states—they control and govern territory, seek to take more
territory from host and external states, and they engage in combat
with external state militaries, much like traditional state-state
international armed conflict. Determining which of these two
bodies of law should apply to terror non-states presents complex
questions. This is not a new question, and it came immediately to
the forefront following 9/11, as commentators began to determine
what international humanitarian law framework should be
applied to Al Qaeda, a diffuse network of terror cells, located all
over the world.157 The recent development of terror non-states, like
ISIS and Boko Haram, however, offers a new dimension to this
question. More than non-state actors of the past, terror non-states
blur the distinctions between states and non-state actors.158
Determining whether international humanitarian law (be
it the law of international armed conflict or the law of noninternational armed conflict) applies is more than just an
interesting academic exercise, as the applicability of international
humanitarian law has real consequences for the combatants and
civilians impacted by the conflict. During peacetime, a state’s
domestic law, not international humanitarian law, applies. Under
domestic law, states are not allowed to target individuals for
killing, nor may they “detain people indefinitely without first
trying them in court.”159 Under the law of international armed
conflict, “warring states may lawfully target enemy combatants
and military objectives,” and hold battlefield detainees “until the
157 See, e.g., Roy S. Schöndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a
New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3–4 (2004) (“Extra-state hostilities do
not naturally fit into the traditional categories of international law. Thus, in the present
state of affairs—for example, in a conflict like that between the United States and Al
Qaeda—the usefulness of traditional dichotomies begins to break down, and a whole array
of uncertainties arises. When extra-state hostilities erupt, does international law recognize
this as an armed conflict, or is the legal status of the situation still one of peace? If there is
an armed conflict under international law, what kind of armed conflict is it—inter-state or
intra-state?” (footnote omitted)).
158 Patrick B. Grant, Islamic Law, International Law, and Non-International
Armed Conflict in Syria, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2017).
159 Schöndorf, supra note 157, at 4.
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cessation of hostilities.”160 The Geneva Conventions provide very
specific guidelines about the protection of civilians and
individuals hors de combat (injured), as well as the treatment of
prisoners of war.161 Under the law of non-international armed
conflict, the “armed forces of the state” may legally “target enemy
combatants and military objectives,” without being prosecuted
under domestic law for crimes such as murder or destruction of
property, but the forces of non-state actors do not receive carte
blanche immunity for their attacks—they can “be prosecuted by
the state” for targeting “the state’s forces and assets.”162 Under the
laws of non-international armed conflict, detained combatants
are not granted prisoner of war status; however, Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions guarantees that detainees may not
be tortured or treated inhumanely, and that they may not be
sentenced without judgment by a duly constituted court affording
“judicial guarantees . . . recognized . . . by civilized peoples.”163
Additionally, during a non-international armed conflict, a state’s
domestic criminal law is deemed to remain in effect.164
The dichotomy between the laws of international armed
conflict and non-international conflict is a consequence of the
historic context in which non-state actors were first recognized
by international humanitarian law. During the 1950s through
the 1980s, the growth of national liberation movements and
domestic armed opposition to colonial powers around the globe
forced the international community to address the treatment of
these non-state actors under international humanitarian law.165
The compromise solution negotiated by participating member
states and representatives of liberation movements was Geneva
Conventions Additional Protocol I, which provided protections
for non-state actor liberation movements and treated such
conflicts as international armed conflicts.166 Other non-state
Id. at 4–5.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
162 Schöndorf, supra note 157, at 5.
163 See Geneva I, supra note 161, at art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 161, at art. 3;
Geneva III, supra note 161 at art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 161, at art. 3; see also Grant,
supra note 158, at 7, Schöndorf, supra note 157, at 5.
164 Schöndorf, supra note 157, at 5.
165 Bassiouni, supra note 154, at 734; see also Grant, supra note 158, at 6.
166 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
160

161
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actors such as dissident armed forces were treated as being part
of non-international armed conflicts.167 Bassiouni argues that
national liberation groups received more favorable treatment
under international law, such as prisoner of war status
attendant with the laws of international armed conflict, on the
expectation that these groups would eventually become the
governing leadership of newly formed, post-colonial states, and
that as such their actions during the conflict would not
necessarily face retribution, or would be subject to amnesty
under the new regime.168 In essence, ensuring that the host
state’s domestic law continues to apply against these non-state
actors, as required by a non-international armed conflict
framework would be of little import once the host state had
ceded power to the liberation movement.
No such expectation regarding successor state formation
applies to terror non-states, and the domestic law of the host
state is likely to remain in effect during and after the resolution
of the conflict with the terror non-state. Further, terror nonstates lack the legitimacy of fighting for the self-determination
of vulnerable populations possessed by national liberation
movements. National liberation movements were treated as
representative liberators ensuring their subjects right to selfdetermination and freedom from oppressive colonial regimes.169
Terror non-states can make no such legitimate claim, as their
governance over their subjects has been by force. Terror nonstates have become the governing oppressive regime and should
not be rewarded under humanitarian law for their oppression of
vulnerable populations. Nevertheless, their significant control of
territory and engagement in hostilities with external states
might suggest that the international community has an interest
in the broader protections available to non-combatants (and
combatants) under the law of international armed conflict.170
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Armed national liberation movements
against “colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the
exercise of their right to self-determination” were treated as international armed
conflicts under Protocol I. Id. at art. 1 ¶ 4.
167 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (addressed non-international
armed conflicts and covered all conflicts not covered in Protocol I “which take place in
the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups”).
168 Bassiouni, supra note 154, at 734–36.
169 Id. at 735.
170 For example, Bassiouni argues that the international community has been
willing to give greater recognition to non-state actors that have controlled territory
because of their relatively more powerful political position. Id. at 736.
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Terror non-states attacks on foreign states elevates their
conflicts to an international status. On the other hand, the
international community also has an interest in not legitimizing
terror non-states as equals to states under international law,
and in ensuring that terror non-states abide by the domestic law
of their host states.171
Ultimately the appropriate framework should be
sensitive to the interests of vulnerable populations impacted by
terror non-states. Granting terror non-states immunity from
domestic law for targeting military objectives in their host state
or within foreign states would serve no purpose other than to
remove host and external state mechanisms for accountability
and deterrence. One might argue that under an international
law of armed conflict framework, terror non-states would be
required to honor prisoner of war protections for captured
combatants. While this is true, the likelihood that terror groups
that have flouted international legal restraints would follow
these restraints is minimal, and under the Geneva Conventions
Common Article 3, which appears in all four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, parties are obligated to treat detainees humanely
in cases of non-international armed conflict.172 Similarly, one

171 One potential option would be to apply a non-international armed conflict
framework so long as the terror non-states only engage in combat with their host state
militaries, and to switch to an international armed conflict framework at the point that
they also become engaged in military hostilities with foreign states—however, this
distinction fails to address the rationale for the dichotomy in substantive rights available
to combatants under the two different frameworks, which does not seem predicated
exclusively upon whether an external state is involved, but rather whether the non-state
actor will become a “successor state” and should ex ante receive “state-like” treatment
during the prosecution of the hostilities.
172 Common Article 3 provides that:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end,
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
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might argue that ISIS and Boko Haram would be incentivized to
attack only military targets—as opposed to civilian targets—
under an international armed conflict framework, as they would
be immune from domestic prosecution for such attacks. Still, the
likelihood that terror groups would be motivated by immunity
from prosecution runs counter to their ideological behavior—the
threat of domestic prosecution has not dissuaded suicide
bombers nor violent extremists from engaging in mass casualty
attacks or systemic human rights abuses, such as the
kidnapping and enslavement of Chibok girls or Yazidi women.173
Because terror non-states are substantively distinct from
national liberation movements in that they oppress, rather than
liberate vulnerable populations, a non-international law of
armed conflict framework is best suited to ensure accountability
for their behavior during and after the conflict. Under this
framework, terror non-state combatants are expected to abide
by humanitarian principles of proportionality and necessity in
their targeting, and to treat detainees humanely, yet they do not
receive immunity from domestic prosecution. As discussed in the
next section, Iraqi, Nigerian and Syrian authorities, to varying
degrees, have the capacity to engage in domestic prosecutions of
terror non-state actors.
VI.

HOLDING TERROR NON-STATES ACCOUNTABLE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

ISIS and Boko Haram have engaged in the widespread
torture, rape, and the unprovoked killing of civilians and noncombatants that violates the tenets of international humanitarian
law, domestic criminal law, international criminal law and
transnational criminal law. Terror non-states violate international
humanitarian law during armed conflict, just as they violate
domestic, international and transnational criminal law in their
terror campaigns at home and abroad. Determining the applicable
legal regimes that should be applied to terror non-states naturally
leads to a discussion of accountability. Proper accountability

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Geneva I, supra note 161, at art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 161, at art. 3; Geneva III, supra
note 161 at art. 3; Geneva IV, supra note 161, at art. 3; see also Schöndorf, supra note
157, at 7; Grant, supra note 158, at 5.
173 As discussed supra Part III.

512

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

requires both a legal framework and an appropriate venue for
adjudication and enforcement.
Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria have differing domestic capacities
for criminal enforcement through their courts and legal systems.174
For example, the Assad regime has engaged in widespread human
rights and humanitarian abuses against ISIS combatants, other
armed revolutionaries, and civilians. The Syrian civil war has left
Syria’s institutions barely functioning in parts of the country, and
Assad has used the courts to target civilians protesting his
regime.175 Any legitimate accountability mechanism for Syria will
require an international forum that addresses the abuses of ISIS
and the Assad regime. Additionally, the Nigerian and Iraqi
militaries similarly have engaged in humanitarian abuses in the
conduct of their wars against Boko Haram and ISIS.
Accountability through domestic institutions and international
mechanisms must also be available for these state actors.
ISIS and Boko Haram are subject to a range of criminal law
frameworks, including domestic, international, and transnational
criminal law. International criminal law is a subset of
international law that prohibits serious atrocities and seeks to hold
perpetrators of those atrocities accountable for their crimes. The
crimes, recognized as falling within international criminal law
categories such as “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity,”
174 See generally Tanya Mehra, Bringing (Foreign) Terrorist Fighters to Justice in
a Post-ISIS Landscape Part I: Prosecutions by Iraqi and Syrian Courts, INT’L CTR. FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM (Dec. 22, 2017), https://icct.nl/publication/bringing-foreign-terroristfighters-to-justice-in-a-post-isis-landscape-part-i-prosecution-by-iraqi-and-syrian-courts/
[https://perma.cc/9Y7F-5Q9M] (“It is estimated that around [three thousand] suspected
members or supporters of IS are awaiting prosecution by Iraqi courts; the majority of whom
will be prosecuted by a specialised criminal court of first instance in Qaraqosh on terrorism
charges. The court hears up to [fifty] cases a day in brief sessions, mostly male fighters that
were picked up as the military defeated IS strongholds in the north. The numbers of those
potentially prosecuted under the Terrorism Law is so large that a law in the summer of
2016 offered amnesty to individuals who joined extremist groups and did not commit a
serious offence.”); see also World Report 2018: Nigeria, supra note 76 (“On October 9 [2017],
authorities began closed-door trials in a Kainji Niger state military base of more than 2,300
Boko Haram suspects, some detained since the insurgency’s inception in 2009. Concerns
about due process and fair hearing heightened when, within four days of trial, 45 of the
first batch of 565 defendants were convicted and sentenced to between three to [thirty-one]
jail terms for undisclosed charges. The court threw out charges against [thirty-four]
discharged 468, and referred twenty-five] defendants for trial in other courts. Prior to
October, only [thirteen] Boko Haram suspects had faced trial, out of which nine were
convicted for alleged involvement in crimes committed by the group.”).
175 See Mehra, supra note 174 (“Military field courts, which are also part of the
Syrian judicial system, are tasked to prosecute members of the military for crimes
committed during armed conflict under the military penal code; however, thousands of
civilians have been prosecuted in mass trials and held at military prisons. Both the
criminal proceedings before the Counter-Terrorism Court and military field courts have
been heavily criticised.”); see also VIOLATIONS DOCUMENTATION CTR. IN SYRIA, supra
note 65, at 2, 4 (detailing Assad’s use of Syrian institutions and the Counterterrorism
Court to target and punish his opposition).
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have been developed and enforced through international criminal
tribunals, such as the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremburg, Germany, and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East in Tokyo, Japan, which were established to try the
senior political and military leadership of Nazi Germany and
Japan following World War II.176 Other international crimes, such
as genocide and torture, are spelled out in treaties such as the
Convention Against Torture and the Genocide Convention.177 As
with humanitarian law, there are gaps in the application of
international criminal law to non-state actors. For example, the
prohibitions in the Genocide Convention and Torture Convention
expressly apply only to state actors who are signatories to those
treaties, not to non-state actors, and “crimes against humanity,”
though not codified in a treaty, have, by custom, only applied to
states.178 Further, the enforcement of international criminal law
has historically required the establishment of an international
tribunal with jurisdiction over the indicted parties.179
One example of an international criminal tribunal is the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was established by
state parties in 2002 to create a permanent venue for the
enforcement of international criminal law.180 Nigeria has ratified
the Rome Statute of the ICC, but Syria and Iraq have neither
signed nor ratified the treaty.181 Prior to the establishment of the
ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals were established
176 The Nuremberg Tribunal, following World War II, established “war crimes,”
“crimes against humanity,” and “crimes against the peace.” Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, 288. These crimes have also been reflected in the statutes of more recent
international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court, International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals,
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 564–66 (2006).
177 Convention Against Torture and Convention Against Genocide are part of the
body of international human rights law as well. United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Torture and Genocide also constitute jus cogens or universal
crimes under customary international law. Philippe Lieberman, Comment, Expropriation,
Torture, and Jus Cogens Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Siderman De Blake
v. Republic of Argentina, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 503, 514 (1993).
178 See Bassiouni, supra note 154, at 719; see also Annalise Lekas, Comment, #ISIS:
The Largest Threat to World Peace Trending Now, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 313, 348–49 (2015).
179 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)—Annex to
the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284; see also Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Jan. 19, 1946).
180 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
181 See Status of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND
&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/4W8P-2NV7].
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for Yugoslavia and Rwanda to deal with the widespread killings
that occurred during conflicts in both countries.182 Additionally,
hybrid international-domestic criminal tribunals have been
established to ensure that prosecutions of international and
domestic law are carried out in jurisdictions where the offenses
occurred with institutional actors from those jurisdictions, for
example, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone.183
Given that neither Iraq nor Syria are parties to the ICC
Statute, a new international tribunal would need to be
established for prosecution of offenses committed during the
conflict, unless by special agreement Iraq and Syria agreed to ICC
jurisdiction or became parties to the statute.184 ISIS combatants
and other groups that committed war crimes during the conflict
in Iraq and Syria would be subject to the jurisdiction of this new
international tribunal. The UN Security Council should approve
an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for ISIS that would
hold ISIS members accountable for any violations of international
criminal law.185 Such a tribunal would cover the widespread
abuses committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The tribunal would
focus its efforts on the ISIS political and military leadership. I
would recommend a regional tribunal, located in Iraq, to draw
from resources and evidence contained in the region, and to allow
for a sense of local and regional justice.186 The court would be
182 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was established by UN
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY],
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by UN Security
Council Resolution 955 (1994), S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR].
183 The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to implement both
international and domestic criminal law prosecutions with the involvement of local
actors and the international community. It is the product of an international agreement
between the United Nations and the Sierra Leone government. See SEAN MURPHY,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 566–67 (3d ed., 2018). The Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, was
created by Cambodian law. The United Nations finalized an agreement with the
Cambodian government establishing UN participation in the body. See id. at 561–62.
184 Rome Statute, supra note 180, at art. 4 ¶ 2.
185 The statute would include international crimes such as “war crimes,”
“crimes against humanity,” and “genocide”. Crimes against humanity would include
crimes such as “rape,” “murder,” “imprisonment,” and “enslavement,” as defined in the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribune for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Forced child soldiering and sexual
slavery should be specified as forms of prosecutable enslavement. I would also include
the crimes of “kidnapping” and “trafficking” given ISIS and Boko Haram’s widespread
use of these practices to raise money and their linkage to sexual enslavement and child
soldiering. See ICTY, supra note 182, art. 5; see also ICTR, supra note 182, art. 3
(defining “crimes against humanity”).
186 Security challenges would exist relative to the establishment of such a court
in Iraq, but I believe the international community’s interest in bringing ISIS to justice
would motivate the necessary expenditures to provide adequate security to the court.
The Iraqi High Tribunal securely carried out adjudications of Saddam Hussein and his
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comprised of both local and international jurists.187 Ideally, the
tribunal would also cover Assad regime abuses, although it is
likely that Russia would veto such an approach given its past
record of protecting the Assad regime within the Security
Council.188 Accountability for the Assad regime would more likely
be addressed through an accountability track within the ongoing
UN Syria peace negotiations or through follow-on negotiations
that would cover amnesty terms and the parameters for local and
international adjudication of humanitarian and human rights
abuses.189 Boko Haram combatants and their opponents are
already subject to ICC referral because Nigeria has ratified the
ICC Statute.190 The international community should engage in
greater cooperation with Nigeria and regional governments to
pursue ICC prosecutions of Boko Haram.
Foreign states should also broadly cooperate in the
prosecution of ISIS soldiers engaged in terrorist attacks against
regime, with U.S. security and legal assistance. See The Iraq Tribunal, GLOBAL POL’Y
FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163-general/28693-theiraq-tribunal.html [https://perma.cc/522J-ZYML]; see also Iraqi High Tribunal, HYBRID
JUSTICE, https://hybridjustice.com/iraqi-high-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/M8W6-AAX8]. I
became the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad the day after Saddam was
executed, and there was widespread criticism of victor’s justice regarding Saddam’s
sentencing and subsequent execution. Bruce Shapiro, Rule of Noose, NATION (Dec. 31,
2006), https://www.thenation.com/article/rule-noose/ [https://perma.cc/8FRY-5BB3]. The
international community could work closely with the Iraqi officials to avoid such results
in the future—the Iraqi High Tribunal was an Iraqi institution, whereas with a hybrid
tribunal approved by the U.N., the international community could have a greater say in
the sentencing and procedures for the trials. See, e.g., The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Its History and Jurisprudence, RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
http://www.rscsl.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/UGB3-QM9J].
187 Akin to the Khmer Rouge Tribunals established in Cambodia. Frequently
Asked Questions—How Judges Are Appointed, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS
OF CAMBODIA (July 24, 2017, 15:38 PM) [hereinafter How Judges Are Appointed],
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/faq/how-are-judges-appointed [https://perma.cc/RZW6-PCHJ].
188 Russia has vetoed eight Security Council Resolutions from 2011–2017
attempting to hold the Assad regime to account for humanitarian abuses in the civil war.
See Euan McKirdy, 8 Times Russia Blocked a UN Security Council Resolution on Syria,
CNN (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:28 AM ET) https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russiaunsc-syria-resolutions/index.html [https://perma.cc/TVM6-QCLJ]. Russia was, however,
willing to authorize Security Council Resolution 2249 against ISIS, after its citizens were
killed in the 2015 ISIS attack of a Russian jetliner over Egypt. See U.N. Press Release
SC/12132, supra note 132; Neil MacFarquhar, Russia Allies with France Against ISIS,
Saying Jet That Crashed in Sinai Was Bombed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/russia-plane-crash-bomb.html [https://
perma.cc/L84B-HZWY]. Similarly, Russia might be willing to authorize an international
justice mechanism specific to ISIS, although it would likely resist any mechanism that
would also hold the Assad regime accountable.
189 See Lisa Roman & Alexander Bick, It’s Time for a New Syria Peace Process,
FOREIGN POL’Y: SHADOW GOV’T (Sept. 15, 2017, 2:47 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/
09/15/its-time-for-a-new-syria-peace-process/ [https://perma.cc/HC7Z-WZSW].
190 The States-Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20r
ome%20statute.aspx. [https://perma.cc/9NQ6-BT9N].
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their territories through the sharing and exchange of
information
under
transnational
legal
conventions.
Transnational criminal law is a body of law that criminalizes
cross-border crimes. Transnational criminal law has developed
from “suppression conventions” intended to suppress illegal
cross-border conduct through the mutual cooperation of
convention parties.191 Suppression conventions include the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the
1988 Vienna Convention Against the Illicit Trade in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.192 The 1997 Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings entered into force in 2001
and requires state parties to create domestic law that
criminalizes the unlawful and intentional use of explosives in
public places with the intent to kill or cause serious bodily
harm.193 State parties may assert jurisdiction over any such acts
committed within their territory, abroad against their facilities
or aircraft, against their nationals, and over any of their
nationals involved in such acts.194 The Convention requires
information sharing, investigation, extradition and prosecution
in relation to terrorist incidents.195 The Convention also
establishes universal jurisdiction in that it requires a state party
to immediately prosecute anyone in their territory who is not
extradited in relation to a terrorist crime, no matter where that
crime was committed.196 Both Iraq and Nigeria acceded to the
Convention in 2013.197 Syria is not a party to the Convention and
is not expressly bound by its provisions.198
The typical groups subject to transnational criminal law
would be a non-state actor criminal enterprise or a terror group
that a state addresses through domestic law enforcement and
cross-state law enforcement cooperation. Scholars have debated
whether transnational criminal law conventions would remain

191 See Dan E. Stigall & Christopher L. Blakesley, Non-State Armed Groups and
the Role of Transnational Criminal Law During Armed Conflicts, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2015).
192 Id. at 10 (citing United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 209 U.N.T.S. 2225; United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 95 U.N.T.S. 1582).
193 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 2,
Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (entered into force May 23, 2001).
194 Id. at art. 6.
195 Id. at art. 7.
196 Id. at art. 8.
197 See Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 10, 2018), https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/6BJF-9PGM].
198 Id.
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in effect during periods of armed conflict.199 Much like certain
domestic laws give way to international humanitarian law
during conflict, some have argued that transnational criminal
law also gives way to the law of armed conflict.200 This distinction
would again seem to draw on a dichotomous perspective
regarding transnational crime: terror groups can either be
criminals operating during peace time that are subject to
domestic and transnational law, or they can be armed hostiles
operating during a time of war subject to the law of armed
conflict, but they may not be both.
This distinction between terror groups as criminals and as
armed hostiles should be rejected because it does not reflect the
reality of how terror non-states like ISIS and Boko Haram operate.
Terror non-states, in fact, engage in armed hostilities with host
state and external state forces, and engage in widespread terror
attacks against states that may or may not be engaged in active
hostilities with them. Even if the law of international armed
conflict applies (supplanting domestic laws of murder and property
destruction) within the area of active hostilities, there is a strong
case to be made that transnational criminal law should still be
deemed in effect in the area of hostilities and outside of that area.
Protecting the authority of transnational criminal law during
conflict ensures that states still victim to terrorist attacks can
cooperate, share information, and prosecute terror non-state actors
responsible for crimes against them, whether they intervene
militarily against the terror non-states or not.
This analysis is similar to the debate as to whether
international human rights law which applies during peace time,
is also deemed to apply during a time of war. The historic U.S.
view had been “no” based upon ICJ jurisprudence that deemed
the law of armed conflict lex specialis, meaning that the context
specific humanitarian law would govern rather than the more
generally applicable human rights law in situations of armed
conflict.201 The U.S. view has evolved, however, and now relies
upon case by case assessments regarding the applicability of

See Stigall & Blakesley, supra note 191, at 2.
See, e.g., Stigall &. Blakesley, supra note 191, at 3 (arguing that “the United
Nations [Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)] articulates a problematic legal
proposition” in its publication entitled International Cooperation in Criminal Matters:
Counterterrorism which stated that “[t]he universal counter-terrorism conventions and
protocols do not apply in situations of armed conflict”) (citing U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND
CRIME, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: COUNTERTERRORISM 28
(2012) (alteration in original), https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/
Training_Curriculum_Module3/Module3_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXS2-VVMP].
201 Id. at 28–29.
199

200
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human rights law in a specific fact setting.202 If terror non-states
engage in terror attacks abroad or domestically, those terror
attacks cannot be excused as legitimate military attacks in
proportion, necessity, or distinction, and states should be able to
contemporaneously seek prosecution of those crimes in domestic
courts within the host state and external states. Even though the
United States and Iraq are engaged in armed conflict with ISIS
in Iraq, both states should be able to contemporaneously
prosecute ISIS followers engaged in terror attacks against U.S.
and Iraqi civilians in U.S. and Iraqi courts under their domestic
and transnational criminal law.
Similarly, Nigerian authorities and border states who are
victims of Boko Haram terror attacks should be able to pursue
prosecutions against Boko Haram during and after the conflict
in their domestic courts. This ability to pursue domestic
prosecution ensures more immediate relief and greater justice
for victims and vulnerable populations, as international
tribunals can take quite some time to establish and take effect.
The liberation and protection of vulnerable populations harmed
by terror non-states would also require that states such as the
United States, with greater resources and technical assistance,
provide support to the domestic courts within Iraq and Nigeria
(and Syria after the civil war ends) to aid in the prosecution of
ISIS and Boko Haram and any government agents guilty of
crimes against vulnerable populations.
VII.

RESCUING INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM TERROR NONSTATES

In order to address terror non-states’ disruption of
international law, international rules should be interpreted in a
manner that most effectively protects and liberates vulnerable
populations, even where historic distinctions between states and
non-state actors have become blurred. For example, when terror
non-states have asserted control over significant territory, terror
non-states must be obligated to respect the full body of
international human rights law that the sovereign states are
obligated to protect. Terror non-states should assume these human
rights obligations under international law, even though they are
not formally recognized as states or governments. This obligation
flows from the principle that international human rights belong to
citizens and any human rights obligation that a predecessor
government has undertaken binds a successor government within
202

Id. at 29.
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the same territory.203 To give this principle effect, I recommend that
the UN Security Council pass a resolution determining that all
non-state actors, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, that take
territorial control from sovereign states, are obligated to protect the
human rights—treaty-based and customary—of all subject citizens
during the period of their control.204
Although terror non-states should not formally be
recognized as states due to their violent taking of territory
contrary to international law, existing state human rights
obligations should be imposed upon them to increase the
likelihood that vulnerable populations receive maximal human
rights protection. As a practical matter, the terror non-state, not
the sovereign state, is the entity in the best position to ensure
those rights are not violated. Similarly, terror non-states should
ensure that the sovereign rights of the people under their control
are respected. This obligation would include ensuring that local
institutions and courts continue to function and not forcing new
systems of justice onto the population, particularly judicial
systems that do not respect human rights norms. Terror nonstate actors can and should be held accountable for any
violations of human rights law during and after the conflict in
domestic courts as well as before international tribunals.
Terror non-states should also be treated like states against
whom external actors should have the right to intervene, without
the requirement that the terror non-states’ actions be attributable
to the host state. Terror non-states’ conduct will rarely be
attributed to host states because they are in direct conflict with
host states for territory. These host states, however, may object to
foreign state intervention because of historic grievances or
territorial concerns. Nonetheless, the quality and nature of terror
non-states’ aggression and attacks against external states should
entitle the external state to intervene in self-defense that is limited,
targeted and specific to deterring the terror non-states’ actions—
even over the objection of host states. Such interventions must also
be targeted in a fashion that protects civilian populations that are
203 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment supra note 98, at 4
(“The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of the
State party. The Human Rights Committee has consistently taken the view, as evidenced
by long-standing practice, that once people are accorded the protection of rights under
the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them,
notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment in
more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the State party
designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant.”).
204 Despite the fact that they are not states, terror non-states should be treated as
such for the purpose of enforcing human rights and other treaty and customary international
law obligations, given their effective control over the population in their territory and their
exclusive ability to ensure the protection of these rights. See discussion supra in Section III.C.
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particularly vulnerable to collateral damage while under terror
non-state control.205 The self-defense justification is strengthened if
it can be demonstrated that host states are “unwilling or unable”
to prevent the terror non-state attacks against external states.
Such an approach would be an evolution in the international law
of intervention but a necessary innovation to provide states with
the necessary tools to defend themselves and their populations
against increasingly active, powerful, and resourced terror nonstates like ISIS and Boko Haram. Such an approach would also
increase the likelihood that terror non-states oppression of
vulnerable populations will come to an end.
Notwithstanding the fact that terror non-states should be
treated like states for the purposes of intervention, they should
be treated like traditional non-state actors in the prosecution of
hostilities, under the rubric of non-international armed conflict.
This means that terror non-states would not receive state-like
protections as liberation groups have under Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions.206 This approach makes sense legally and
practically. As incursion forces, terror non-states, such as ISIS
and Boko Haram, cannot make the same substantive legal claim
that they are freeing vulnerable populations from colonizing
regimes—claims which undergirded the drafting of Protocol I.207
Further, terror non-states have not demonstrated respect for
international humanitarian law in their conduct during
hostilities—so awarding them immunity from domestic law
would reward perverse behaviors. Notwithstanding the fact that
external actors may become involved in hostilities with terror
non-states, under a historic state-centric international armed
conflict framework, terror non-states should remain subject to
the domestic laws of the sovereign state. Their external
intervention should not obviate their being held subject to
domestic law. The application of a non-international armed
conflict framework would make clear that terror non-states
remain subject to domestic criminal law and transnational
criminal law, which can be enforced during and after the conflict
205 For example, ISIS regularly contravenes international humanitarian law by
using civilians as “human shields” against air strikes. See Ahmed Rasheed & Michael
Georgy, Islamic State Said to Use Human Shields As Coalition Advances on Mosul,
REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2016, 7:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisiraq/islamic-state-said-to-use-human-shields-as-coalition-advances-on-mosul-idUSKCN
12I17X [https://perma.cc/V23N-U28W]; see also Charles Dunlap, Jr., No Good Options
Against ISIS Barbarism? Human Shields in 21st Century Conflicts, 110 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND 311, 311–16 (2017).
206 Protocol I, supra note 166, at art. 1 ¶ 4.
207 This is not to say that terror non-states, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, will
not claim that they are acting against oppressive regimes, however such claims are
undermined by their own oppressive actions towards their victimized subjects.
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in the domestic courts of sovereign and external states. This
increases the likelihood of protection and accountability for
vulnerable populations harmed by terror non-states.
Finally, the accountability of terror non-states should be
pursued through domestic and international tribunals, depending
upon the capacity of the legal system in each country. It is clear
that non-state actors can be prosecuted for international crimes
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Under the terms of the Rome Statute of the ICC, any person
present in the territory of a signatory state is subject to its
international criminal law provisions.208 In the case of Nigeria,
this makes Boko Haram internationally criminally responsible
for its conduct inside and outside of Nigeria. Prosecutions against
Boko Haram’s leadership can be pursued within the ICC.
Nigeria’s domestic courts should also receive resource and
capacity assistance from the international community for the
prosecution of crimes against those members of Boko Haram that
are not the group’s leaders. Nigeria may also choose to develop an
amnesty law and reconciliation measures for certain participants
in Boko Haram abuses, such as kidnapped and coerced child
soldiers. Similarly, states that were the subject of attacks by Boko
Haram (Nigeria’s Lake Chad neighbors and others) should also
have the ability to develop criminal prosecutions against specific
individuals that carried out attacks on their territory, relying
upon international cooperation mechanisms formalized in
transnational criminal law conventions. The international
community should also expand assistance and capacity support
for domestic prosecutions in these countries as well.
In the case of ISIS, as neither Syria nor Iraq is a party to
the ICC, the UN Security Council should approve an ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for ISIS that would hold ISIS
members accountable for any violations of international criminal
law.209 Such a tribunal would cover the widespread abuses
committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The tribunal would focus its
efforts on the ISIS political and military leadership. I would
recommend a regional tribunal, located in Iraq, to draw from
resources and evidence contained in the region, and to allow for a
sense of local and regional justice.210 The court would be comprised
of both local and international jurists.211 Ideally, the tribunal
would also cover Assad regime abuses, although it is probable
208
209
210
211

Rome Statute, supra note 180, at arts. 1, 4 ¶ 2.
See sources cited supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See How Judges Are Appointed, supra note 187.
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that Russia would veto such an approach given its past record of
protecting the Assad regime within the Security Council.212
Accountability for the Assad regime would more likely be
addressed through an accountability track within the ongoing UN
Syria peace negotiations or through follow-on negotiations that
would cover amnesty terms and the parameters for local and
international adjudication of humanitarian and human rights
abuses.213 As with Boko Haram, foreign states would broadly
cooperate in the prosecution of ISIS soldiers engaged in terrorist
attacks against their territories through the sharing and
exchange of information under transnational legal conventions,
which would remain in effect during and after hostilities end.
CONCLUSION
Terror non-states, such as ISIS and Boko Haram, have not
only caused violence and destruction globally, but have disrupted
international legal frameworks developed to minimize conflict
and abuse. By moderating the state/non-state actor dichotomy,
the international community can enforce international law
against terror non-states in a manner best suited to curb their
worst abuses and to hold them to account for their actions.
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